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After judges issue final orders and judgments, losing defendants 
often ask courts to make a determination that may seem to be a mere 
procedural technicality, but is, instead, a new battleground for 
injunctive litigation. These judges are deciding whether to grant a stay 
pending appeal—whether to prevent the enforcement of a court order 
or judgment until a court has decided the appeal. Because litigating 
and deciding an appeal can take years and because the issues at the 
heart of much of civil injunctive litigation are extremely time-sensitive, 
determining whether to grant or deny a stay is a momentous decision. 
By deciding requests for stays pending appeal, federal judges have 
decided if Texas could enforce health and safety regulations, or if 
clinics could provide abortions in the state; if 300,000 registered 
voters in Wisconsin would be able to vote, or if the state could enforce 
its duly-enacted provisions to regulate elections and prevent voter 
fraud; if states could determine requirements for marriage, or if same-
sex couples could marry; if the President could enforce an Executive 
Order regarding national security, or if Muslims could enter the 
country regardless of religion; and, arguably, if the forty-third US 
President would be Al Gore or George W. Bush. 
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The standard for stay determinations ostensibly includes four 
factors: (1) the likelihood of success on appeal; (2) the likelihood of 
irreparable harm pending appeal; (3) the balance of the hardships; 
and (4) the public interest. However, there is more idiosyncrasy than 
standard because courts vary so widely regarding what constitutes 
each prong and the manner in which courts should weigh each prong, 
if at all. Compounding the absence of a uniform stays standard, courts 
frequently give no reasoning or opinion for stay determinations. With 
life-changing (and potentially world-changing) issues on the line 
pending appeal, stays are a nearly law-free zone. The immense 
consequences of stay determinations, due to lengthy appeals and the 
time-bound nature of the underlying injunctions or orders, mean that 
courts need to make an effort to get stay decisions right. 
The author argues that the purpose of a stay pending appeal is to 
protect a meaningful opportunity to appeal where guaranteed. The 
Article suggests different standards for stays, turning on whether 
review is guaranteed or discretionary. The author also asserts that 
courts should write reasoned opinions for stay decisions. 
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When deciding a request for a stay pending appeal, a court determines 
whether to prevent the enforcement of a final order or judgment until an appellate 
court issues an opinion. It may seem that judicial decisions regarding stays 
pending appeal do not matter much within the civil injunctive landscape. After 
all, a stay pending appeal, or its absence, would only affect parties for a limited 
time because the mechanism is temporary by definition. What could happen in 
that time-bound period between injunctive order or judgment and appellate 
decision? A lot. Review by a court of appeals or the Supreme Court can take 
much longer than one might assume. During the often-lengthy appeals process, 
the real-world implications for civil injunctive parties can be of serious and 
irreversible consequence. This means that courts should make a serious attempt 
to get stay decisions “right.” But they don’t. Current judicial practice for stays 
pending appeal lacks transparency, uniformity, and accountability. 
A stay pending appeal is the primary mechanism that allows a losing party1 
to prevent enforcement of a final judgment granting an injunction in a civil 
matter while appeal is pending.2 The areas in which decisions on stays pending 
 
 1. This Article specifies that “a losing party” and, more specifically, a losing defendant, can 
request or possibly obtain a stay pending appeal because a winning party, or a winning plaintiff, would 
not request a stay of a judgment or order in their favor. See Daniel M. Gonen, Judging in Chambers: 
The Powers of a Single Justice of the Supreme Court, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1159, 1174 (2008) (“[O]ften 
where a lower court has denied an injunction, there is nothing to stay.”). 
 2. Such appellants cannot obtain stays by supersedeas bond. FED. R. CIV. P. 62(d). 
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appeal are immensely consequential extend to nearly every corner of our social 
order. For example, courts that decided whether to stay an order or judgment 
pending appeal effectively determined who could marry, or whether states could 
define marriage requirements;3 whether states could enforce health and safety 
provisions, or whether clinics could provide abortions;4 whether registered 
voters could cast ballots in an election, or whether states could prevent voter 
fraud;5 whether a high school could implement polices to promote child safety 
and prevent bullying, or whether a teenager could use the restroom in which they 
felt comfortable;6 and whether the President could set immigration policies to 
ensure national security, or whether Muslims could enter the United States 
regardless of their religion.7 
Even though these stay determinations did not decide the underlying issues 
finally and permanently, some impacts of stay determinations cannot be undone.8 
After an appellate court reviews the matter, a student may already have graduated 
and cannot go back in time to include prayer as a part of their education. 
Conversely, a school that allowed prayer during the interim cannot later undo the 
potential religious coercion that students may have been subjected to due to 
prayer in school. Likewise, doctors, states, or assault victims cannot go back in 
time to perform abortions, count or refuse ballots, or arm themselves in self-
defense, respectively. After allowing people to carry certain types of guns in 
public spaces has led to a public shooting, a state cannot retroactively protect 
those who were already shot resulting in injury or death. Stay determinations are 
not just procedural technicalities; they are, instead, the new battleground of 
injunctive litigation.9 
This Article primarily focuses on stays of final injunctive court orders or 
judgments pending appeal,10 but courts can also stay many other types of orders 
 
 3. Strange v. Searcy, 135 S. Ct. 940 (2015) (mem.) (denying application for stay of injunction 
preventing the enforcement of Alabama law provisions limiting marriage to heterosexual couples). 
 4. Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 135 S. Ct. 399 (2014) (mem.) (vacating the Court of 
Appeals’ stay of district court’s order enjoining Texas requirements for clinics that provide abortions 
and denying the application in other respects). 
 5. Frank v. Walker, 135 S. Ct. 7 (2014) (mem.) (vacating the Court of Appeals’ stay of the 
district court’s permanent injunction preventing the enforcement of Wisconsin voter identification 
requirement). This Article often uses examples from recent Supreme Court terms (especially regarding 
marriage, abortion, and voting in elections), but this is also true of stay determinations in a more general 
sense. 
 6. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G., 136 S. Ct. 2442, 2442 (2016) (mem.) (granting stay of 
district court’s preliminary injunction allowing a transgender student access to boys’ restrooms at his 
high school). 
 7. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1152 (9th Cir. 2017) (denying emergency request for 
stay pending appeal of order enjoining the enforcement of Exec. Order No. 13769). 
 8. See infra Part I. 
 9. See id. 
 10. This Article leaves stays in the areas of criminal matters and habeas corpus appeals for future 
inquiry. See id. This Article also excludes from discussion various types of claims that have their own 
separate stay standards and procedure, including bankruptcy, copyright or patent, damages, habeas 
corpus, and criminal matters. See infra note 69. 
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or proceedings.11 When federal courts determine stays of injunctive orders12 
pending appeal, courts ostensibly consider four factors: whether the movant has 
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits; whether the movant is likely 
to suffer irreparable harm if the court denies a stay; whether the balance of the 
hardships to the parties counsels in favor of issuing a stay;13 and where the public 
interest lies.14 
Nevertheless, courts’ analyses vary so widely from case to case regarding 
what constitutes each prong and the manner in which courts should weigh each 
prong, if at all, that idiosyncrasy, not standard, reigns.15 These are not circuit 
splits, with the courts of appeals divided into a few main camps on what 
constitutes each prong or how to weigh the factors. The variability of stay 
determinations is not within the normal range of outcomes that we would expect 
from typical discretionary determinations. Instead, the factors that courts use are 
arbitrary and vary unpredictably.16 Compounding the absence of a uniform, 
principled stays standard, courts seldom offer reasoning or publish opinions for 
stay determinations.17 This is nearly a law-free zone. These haphazard, sparse 
standards,18 along with the dearth of written opinions on stays,19 suggests that 
there is little rhyme or reason to support courts’ stay determinations. 
Consequently, these inconsistencies regarding stays require critical examination. 
Until now, scholars have not given serious consideration to the 
consequences of court decisions on stays pending appeal.20 This Article sheds 
 
 11. Although this Article refers to some cases outside of civil stays of final orders pending 
appeal relied upon by courts for doctrinal standards, it largely sets aside stays of execution, stays of 
removal, and habeas proceedings for future investigation for reasons explained at infra note 69. 
 12. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62 differentiates between stays for injunctions and stays for 
damages. As discussed below, the substance and procedure of stay determinations in actions for 
damages is arguably clearer than that of those involving injunctive relief. For example, under Rule 62(d), 
the party appealing a judgment may obtain a stay by supersedeas bond except if the appeal is from an 
interlocutory or final judgment in an action for an injunction. FED. R. CIV. P. 62(d). 
 13. Courts often describe this as determining “whether issuance of the stay will substantially 
injure the other parties interested in the proceeding.” See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426 (2009); 
infra note 103. 
 14. See Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987); see also Nken, 556 U.S. at 434 (citing 
and applying Hilton factors to a request for a stay of removal pending judicial review). 
 15. See infra Part III.A. 
 16. See id. 
 17. See infra Part III.B. Most stay requests to the Supreme Court are to individual circuit justices 
and thus are not even listed in the Supreme Court’s orders list. Gonen, supra note 1, at 1226–27. 
 18. See infra Part III.A. 
 19. See infra Part III.B. 
 20. Other scholars have argued for reform of aspects of Supreme Court stay determinations. See 
William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 1 (2015) 
(looking to the Supreme Court’s October Term 2013 and arguing for more transparency in, and 
explanation of, stay and summary reversal orders); Josh Blackman & Howard M. Wasserman, The 
Process of Marriage Equality, 43 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 243 (2016) (documenting how stays, along 
with injunctions and mandamus proceedings, furthered and frustrated marriage equality cases); John Y. 
Gotanda, The Emerging Standards for Issuing Appellate Stays, 45 BAYLOR L. REV. 809 (1993) (arguing 
for a two-tier sliding scale in stays); Richard L. Hasen, Reining in the Purcell Principle, 43 FLA. ST. U. 
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light on the importance of stay pending appeal determinations. It argues that the 
primary purpose of granting a stay pending appellate review is to ensure a 
meaningful opportunity to appeal. That purpose is in tension with finality 
concerns, which require courts to enforce their orders and judgments. When 
courts decide requests for stays of court orders, courts must balance these two 
opposing values. Courts currently carry out this difficult task with very little 
precedent or procedure to guide them.21 
Intuition might suggest that the best way to obtain uniformity in stay 
determinations is to have one cohesive standard across all stay requests 
regardless of the availability of appellate review. Yet the only way to obtain 
uniformity in stays pending appeal that fulfills their purpose is somewhat 
counterintuitive. The standard for stay determinations should differ and turn on 
the extent of the availability of review for the underlying order or judgment. 
Moreover, courts should more frequently write reasoned opinions for decisions 
on stays pending appeal requests, and courts should reform procedure for stays 
determinations. 
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I describes the stakes of stay 
determinations and situates those consequences within the temporal context of 
the appellate process. These temporary procedural decisions impose long-term 
outcomes. Part II describes stay procedures, discusses the stay standard, and 
compares stays pending appeal to other somewhat similar procedural 
mechanisms. Part III demonstrates that, despite the existence of a standard for 
stays, courts either apply the standard inconsistently or do not apply the standard 
at all. Part IV suggests that a potential reason for courts’ inconsistency in 
applying the stay standard is that they do not make stay decisions according to 
any guiding purpose. This Part then proposes a principled basis for stay pending 
appeal determinations. Part V suggests a model for stays pending appeal that 
brings both the standard and procedures in line with this recommended primary 
 
L. REV. 427, 464 (2016) (arguing that, when making stay determinations in cases involving voting rights 
and elections procedures, the Supreme Court should consider the implications of Purcell v. Gonzalez, 
549 U.S. 1 (2006), as one factor among many); Alison M. Newman, Doing the Public a Disservice: 
Behavioral Economics and Maintaining the Status Quo, 64 DUKE L.J. 1173 (2015) (employing 
behavioral economics analysis and examples of marriage and abortion litigation to argue that the public 
interest counsels in favor of staying, or not granting, injunctions protecting individual rights); Lois J. 
Scali, Comment, Prediction-Making in the Supreme Court: The Granting of Stays by Individual Justices, 
32 UCLA L. REV. 1020 (1985) (proposing elimination of the likelihood of success requirement for 
Supreme Court justices); Daniel C. Tucker, Note, We Can’t Stay This Way: Changing the Standard for 
Staying Injunctions Pending Appeal After eBay, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1276 (2011) (proposes new 
standard for stays pending appeal in patent cases). In contrast, there is a vast literature on injunctions, 
especially preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders. See, e.g., OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS INJUNCTION 11 (1978) [hereinafter FISS, INJUNCTION]; DOUG RENDLEMAN, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON REMEDIES 156–312 (6th ed. 1999); Kevin J. Lynch, The Lock-in Effect of Preliminary 
Injunctions, 66 FLA. L. REV. 779 (2014) (discussing the effect of cognitive bias on judicial decision-
making regarding injunctions). 
 21. See infra Part III. 
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purpose of stays. This Part also argues that courts should write reasoned opinions 
for many stay determinations. 
The lessons from stays pending appeal also hold import for much more than 
the substantive standards and procedure of stays. Interrogating the procedure for 
stays is part of a larger conversation to systematize the study of procedure. While 
judges and courts generally have freedom to govern themselves and to determine 
their own procedures, procedure can still have significant and lasting substantive 
consequences—as is the case with stays of final orders pending appeal. This 
Article is part of a call to focus on the procedure of procedure: how procedure 
develops and what hinders or furthers procedural decision-making. 
I. 
THE STAKES OF STAYS 
Stay decisions of civil injunctive orders are important because the matters 
at issue are often time sensitive, appeals can take years, and litigants can be 
seriously and irreversibly injured while appeal is pending. For judges, the 
predicament of stay pending appellate review requests is that judges must decide 
between giving effect to a court’s reasoned decision or order and allowing for a 
meaningful appeal. Although both parties and the public are “generally entitled 
to the prompt execution of orders,”22 giving effect to a court’s order while review 
is pending can render an appeal null and cement a lower court’s decision even if 
an appellate court will eventually find it erroneous or reverse it. On the other 
hand, it hardly seems fair or efficient to hold an order in abeyance, perhaps for 
years, while an appeal is pending, when a court already gave the matter full 
consideration. These orders are final, or at least not reached in a preliminary or 
ex parte manner. They are decided without limitations of time, evidence, or 
procedure. Quite the contrary, many are even the results of completed trials. 
Thus, when a court decides whether to stay an order or judgment pending appeal, 
the court may deny or irreparably delay justice to a party even though subsequent 
courts could find in his or her favor at every level of appeal.23 
The procedural mechanism of stays pending appeal exists in the US judicial 
system because cases are often complicated. Much is at stake while an appeal is 
pending, and the passage of time allows events to transpire that become difficult 
to disentangle after parties begin to rely on, and make choices based on, present 
circumstances. Basic principles of justice—for example, that courts should treat 
similar cases in similar ways—require that legal standards limit discretion such 
that “[d]iscretion is not whim.”24 
 
 22. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 427 (2009); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 62(a) (providing 
that, generally speaking, executions may issue fourteen days after the entry of a judgment). 
 23. See infra Part II.A. 
 24. See Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005) (citing Henry J. Friendly, 
Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 758 (1982)); see also Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2940365 
876 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  106:869 
Although it is difficult to approximate the numbers of stays that defendants 
request from district courts, courts of appeals, and the Supreme Court per year, 
Supreme Court justices may receive 150 to 200 applications for stays per term,25 
and nearly all of the matters with applications for stays before the Supreme Court 
first requested stays from the district court or court of appeals.26 
A circumstance that heightens the stakes of stay pending appeal decisions 
is the possibility that so much time can pass before a court of appeals or the 
Supreme Court concludes all review. This delay can cause a court’s stay decision 
to allow an entity to fully implement an illegal law or prevent an entity from 
implementing lawful provisions, without any mechanism to reverse that 
afterward. 
The different levels of federal courts receive numerous requests for stays 
on some of the most controversial public issues of the day.27 By determining 
requests for stays pending appeal of injunctive orders and judgments, judges and 
justices can make irreversible decisions that have a significant impact on litigants 
and on society.28 Below is a discussion of some of the real-life stakes of stay 
pending appeal decisions. There are innumerable examples of litigation where 
decisions regarding stays pending appeal could have, and sometimes have had, 
significant consequences. 
Agency regulations. Full review of federal regulations may take years. If a 
court does not prevent implementation of agency rules pending review, the 
agency may implement the rules in the meantime such that it is impossible to 
undo implementation even if a court later invalidates the rule. This can result in 
extremely high costs for the regulated industries. Conversely, halting the 
implementation of something like the Clean Power Plan, pending review, could 
prevent the United States from fulfilling its commitment29 to the United Nations 
 
Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1926 (2016) (affirming that a court’s judgment on a matter of discretion 
should be “guided by sound legal principles”). 
 25. See Gonen, supra note 1, at 1172 (noting that, from 2001 to 2005, the Court received 
approximately 1,000 to 1,200 applications to individual justices each term and that nearly 20 percent of 
those applications are applications for stays). 
 26. See infra notes 72, 78. 
 27. See supra notes 3–7 and Part I. 
 28. See STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO, ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 872 (10th ed. 2013) 
[hereinafter SUPREME COURT PRACTICE] (such “relief may be of the utmost importance, even to the 
point of life-or-death significance”); see also Gonen, supra note 1, at 1163–64: 
Because appellate review of a case can take months or years, the effect of a lower court’s 
judgment while a case makes its way through the appellate process can have drastic 
implications for the parties. In some cases, . . . the decision of a single Justice will have the 
same effect as a decision on the merits. 
 29. White House, Fact Sheet: US Reports its 2025 Emissions Target to the UNFCCC (Mar. 31, 
2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/31/fact-sheet-us-reports-its-2025-
emissions-target-unfccc [https://perma.cc/LK8K-2FPB] (announcing how the Clean Power Plan would 
help achieve the U.S.’s commitments to the Paris Climate Accord). But the US may withdraw from the 
Paris Agreement, an agreement regarding greenhouse gas emissions mitigation within the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Communication 
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to combat global warming by reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 26 to 28 
percent by 2025. 
Michigan v. EPA30 serves as an example of the stakes at play for stay 
determinations regarding injunctive orders of agency regulations generally and, 
more specifically, of environmental protections: 
The day after [the Supreme] Court ruled in Michigan [sic] that EPA 
had violated the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) in enacting its rule regulating 
fossil fuel-fired power plants . . . , EPA boasted in an official blog post 
that the Court’s decision was effectively a nullity. Because the rule had 
not been stayed during the years of litigation, EPA assured its 
supporters that “the majority of power plants are already in compliance 
or well on their way to compliance.” Then, in reliance on EPA’s 
representation that most power plants had already fully complied, the 
D.C. Circuit responded to this Court’s remand by declining to vacate 
the rule that this Court had declared unlawful. In short, EPA extracted 
“nearly $10 billion a year” in compliance from power plants before this 
Court could even review the rule, and then successfully used that 
unlawfully-mandated compliance to keep the rule in place even after 
this Court declared that the agency had violated the law.31 
Abortion. Whether a court stays an order holding abortion restrictions 
unconstitutional either significantly reduces the availability of abortions or 
prevents a state from regulating the procedures. Abortion regulations are one of 
the areas where court decisions regarding stays have obvious impacts while 
appeal is pending. If a court stays an order enjoining enforcement of abortion 
restrictions, women who may have otherwise received abortions may not. If a 
court does not stay such an order, it is likely that the public health or life-
preserving purposes of the regulations will be thwarted in the interim. 
Decisions on stays pending appeal of abortion-related injunctions have high 
stakes, both for states attempting to regulate abortion and for women trying to 
obtain abortions.32 The effects of courts’ stay determinations regarding Texas’s 
 
Regarding Intent to Withdraw from Paris Agreement (Aug. 4, 2017), 
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/08/273050.htm [https://perma.cc/TLD7-8QWF]. 
 30. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). 
 31. Application by 29 States and State Agencies for Immediate Stay of Final Agency Action 
During Pendency of Petitions for Review at 1–2, West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016) (No. 
15A773) (internal citations omitted); see also Jonathan H. Adler, Supreme Court Puts the Brakes on the 
EPA’s Clean Power Plan, WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/02/09/supreme-court-puts-the-
brakes-on-the-epas-clean-power-plan/ [http://perma.cc/PD8U-KJSG] (suggesting that the US Supreme 
Court granted a stay halting implementation of the Clean Power Plan in part because the Court was 
“concerned about a replay of Michigan v. EPA, in which the court invalidated another EPA rule to little 
practical effect”). 
 32. See David S. Cohen, What Constitutes an Emergency?: The Supreme Court Will Stay a 
Lower Court’s Ruling Only for the Benefit of Politics, Not People, SLATE (Oct. 18, 2014), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/10/supreme_court_stay_orders_p
olitics_wins_out_in_gay_marriage_abortion_affordable.html [https://perma.cc/DHY4-4RPC]. 
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abortion restrictions33 are a fitting example of these potential risks to women 
seeking abortions. After plaintiffs sued to prevent enforcement of new abortion 
restrictions in Texas and courts’ stay decisions34 allowed for enforcement of the 
restrictions, the number of Texas abortion clinics decreased from forty-one to 
eighteen, and there was a 14 percent drop in the number of abortions performed 
in the state.35 
Tobacco and Cigarette Industry. Stay decisions in litigation against tobacco 
companies and cigarette manufacturers can have unique financial and health 
ramifications. In United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.,36 the district court 
enjoined the defendant cigarette manufacturers and tobacco-related trade 
organizations from certain marketing practices and ordered certain corrective 
statements and marketing disclosures. If the court had stayed that order, the stay 
would have arguably resulted in increased illnesses and deaths by cigarettes. 
Defendants argued that, if the court did not stay the order pending appeal, 
compliance could cost the defendants millions of dollars and could cause them, 
irrecoverably, to lose market share to companies not subject to the order.37 The 
district court, however, denied the stay motion because “smokers, potential 
smokers, young people exposed to Defendants’ extensive and ubiquitous 
advertising and marketing campaigns, and those exposed (particularly the very 
young and elderly) to environmental tobacco smoke (‘ETS’) will be directly and 
seriously harmed if a stay is granted.”38 
Marriage. Before the Supreme Court resolved the question of whether 
same-sex couples had the right to marry in Obergefell v. Hodges,39 stay decisions 
either prevented states from determining marriage requirements and left tens of 
thousands of couples in limbo,40 or risked preventing couples who could not 
 
 33. See H.B. No. 2, 83rd Leg., 2d Spec. Sess., (Tex. 2013) [hereinafter H.B. 2]; TEX. HEALTH 
& SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0031(a) (West Cum. Supp. 2015); Id. § 245.010(a). 
 34. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2299 (2016); Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 567, 598 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 
769 F.3d 285, 305 (5th Cir. 2014), vacated in part, 135 S. Ct. 399 (2014). 
 35. Erik Eckholm, Texas Ruling on Abortion Leads to Call for Clarity, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/11/us/clarity-sought-on-undue-burden-standard-for-
abortion-laws.html [https://perma.cc/UP2Z-WKXB]; Daniel Grossman, Kari White, Kristine Hopkins 
& Joseph E. Potter, Change in Distance to Nearest Facility and Abortion in Texas, 2012 to 2014, 317 
JAMA NETWORK 437 (2017); Paul J. Weber, Study: Texas Abortions Declined as Clinics Got Farther 
Away, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 19 2017), https://apnews.com/3a0c19143ef5493082ed4a2c520e44b2 
[https://perma.cc/TRV9-GZ3Q]. 
 36. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 37. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 988, 991 (D.D.C. 2006) (denying 
motion to stay the final judgment and remedial order pending appeal). 
 38. Id. at 990. 
 39. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 40. See, e.g., Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 557–58 (W.D. Ky. 2014), rev’d sub nom. 
DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2584 (“The 
Court has concerns about implementing an order which has dramatic effects, and then having that order 
reversed . . . . Under such circumstances, rights once granted could be cast in doubt.”); Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 928 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 
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marry from receiving marital benefits, including parental rights.41 Stay decisions 
had potentially life-changing and society-changing significance. 
States were unlikely to somehow “unmarry” same-sex couples who married 
while marriage was available to them while appeals or certiorari were pending.42 
Conversely, a same-sex couple could not have retroactively married if one 
member of the couple had become incompetent or passed away while appeal or 
certiorari were pending. 
The “Muslim Ban” or “Travel Ban” and Presidential Executive Orders. The 
executive orders and federal agency actions43 that have come, and may continue 
to come, out of Donald Trump’s presidency highlight the import of stay 
determinations.44 Some estimate that Trump’s initial executive order banning 
 
1052 (9th Cir. 2012); Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 79 A.3d 1036, 1041 (N.J. 2013) (rejecting state’s 
argument that “once it grants marriage licenses to even a handful of same-sex couples, it is virtually 
impossible . . . to undo that action later” and commenting that “California’s experience reveals the 
opposite”); Idaho Brief in Support of an Emergency Application of Governor C.L. “Butch” Otter to Stay 
Mandate Pending Disposition of Applications for Stay Pending Rehearing and Certiorari at 3–4, Otter 
v. Latta, 135 S. Ct. 344 (2014) (No. 14A374) (“A stay is also necessary to minimize the enormous 
disruption to the State and its citizens of potentially having to ‘unwind’ hundreds of same-sex marriages 
[pending the Ninth Circuit’s decision] . . . .”). 
 41. A same-sex couple could not have retroactively married if one member of the couple had 
become incompetent or passed away while appeal or certiorari were pending. See Cohen, supra note 32. 
But courts may find retroactive marriages in the eight states that recognize common law marriage. See 
Andrew Dys, Same-Sex Legal Groundbreaker: Judge Says Rock Hill Couple Married in S.C. for 
Decades, HERALD (Mar. 19, 2017 7:12 P.M.), 
http://www.heraldonline.com/news/local/article139540723.html#storylink=cpy 
[https://perma.cc/SY29-5T7Y] (South Carolina judge held that two women had been in a common law 
marriage for over thirty years); Stephanie Francis Ward, Family Court Judge Rules Obergefell Applies 
Retroactively, and Women Had a Common-Law Marriage, ABA J. (Mar. 20, 2017), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/obergefell_applies_retroactively_says_family_law_court_jud
ge#When:20:30:00Z [https://perma.cc/Q5ZQ-2BQB]. 
 42. See Bourke, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 557–58; Garden State Equal., 79 A.3d at 1041 (“[T]he State 
contends that ‘once it grants marriage licenses to even a handful of same-sex couples, it is virtually 
impossible . . . to undo that action later’.”). Idaho’s brief in Otter v. Latta, supporting an emergency 
application to stay, noted that “allowing such marriages now will undercut this Court’s unique role as 
final arbiter of the profoundly important constitutional questions surrounding the constitutionality of 
State marriage laws.” Idaho Brief in Support of Emergency Application of Governor C.L. “Butch” Otter 
to Stay Mandate Pending Disposition of Applications for Stay Pending Rehearing and Certiorari, supra 
note 40, at 3–4. 
 43. See Pres. Memorandum, 83 Fed. Reg. 13367 (Mar. 23, 2018) (“Military Service by 
Transgender Individuals”); Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017) (“Enhancing 
Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists 
or Other Public-Safety Threats”); Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017) 
(“Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States”); Exec. Order No. 13,769, 
82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) (“Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United 
States”); Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017) (“Enhancing Public Safety in the 
Interior of the United States”); Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017) (“Border 
Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements”). 
 44. This Article leaves detailed discussion of stays pending appeal of agency or executive orders 
and stays of removal for separate development. Portia Pedro, Staying Agency (2017) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). Stays of agency orders are in accordance with rules specific to 
agencies. See FED. R. APP. P. 18; 2d Cir. R. 18. 
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some travel from specified Muslim countries affected hundreds of people in the 
first three days45 and would have affected more than 65,000 visas in total.46 A 
number of federal district court judges issued nationwide preliminary stays of 
removals47 that would have occurred pursuant to the order.48 The decision to stay 
orders preventing enforcement of the travel bans could threaten public safety by 
letting likely terrorists into the country. After people are allowed into the 
country, it becomes increasingly complicated and difficult to remove them, and 
acts of violence that they commit while in the United States cannot be undone. 
The decision to grant stays of orders preventing the enforcement of the travel 
bans could result in US citizens being separated from their relatives, universities 
 
 45. See Lauren McGaughy and Holly K. Hacker, Trump Travel Ban Affects Hundreds of 
Students, Faculty at Texas Universities, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Jan. 31, 2017), 
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/higher-education/2017/01/30/ut-urges-immigrant-faculty-students-
avoid-mexican-border-travel-overseas [https://perma.cc/ET5Q-5Y6N]; see also Laura King, Barbara 
Demick & James Queally, Confusion Reigns at U.S. Airports as Protests of Trump Executive Order 
Enter Second Day, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-pol-trump-
immigration-vetting-20170129-story.html [https://perma.cc/R45V-NW9P]. 
 46. See Alicia A. Caldwell, 60,000 Visas Canceled by Trump Order, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 4, 
2017), http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2017/02/03/visas-canceled-trump-
order/D2d0kU0CwVXkpbCY2pLrrO/story.html [https://perma.cc/DZ85-42AY]; Kathryn Casteel & 
Andrea Jones-Rooy, Trump’s Latest Travel Order Still Looks a Lot Like a Muslim Ban, FIVE THIRTY 
EIGHT (Sept. 28, 2017), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/trumps-latest-travel-order-still-looks-a-lot-
like-a-muslim-ban [https://perma.cc/U2SH-SBK2]; Glenn Kessler, The Number of People Affected by 
Trump’s Travel Ban: About 90,000, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2017/01/30/the-number-of-people-affected-
by-trumps-travel-ban-about-90000/?utm_term=.e73b31a79803 [https://perma.cc/RM78-C9L8]. 
 47. Stays of removals, and particularly emergency stays of removals, differ from other 
injunctive stays of final orders or judgments pending appeal in a number of ways. See discussion at infra 
note 70. Nevertheless, as the Trump administration issues more executive orders and opponents 
challenge the orders in court, there may be significant stay decisions regarding final injunctive orders 
during this presidency. 
 48. See Darweesh v. Trump, No. 17 CIV. 480 (AMD), 2017 WL 388504, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 
28, 2017) (granting emergency motion for stay of removal); Ariane de Vogue, Eli Watkins & Alanne 
Orjoux, Homeland Security to Comply with Orders Not to Deport Travelers, CNN (Jan. 29, 2017), 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/29/politics/ny-immigration-order-stay [https://perma.cc/V2S5-Z4WH] 
(reporting that federal district court judges in New York, Virginia, and Washington state temporarily 
prevented the enforcement of the executive order “for citizens of seven Muslim-majority countries who 
have already arrived in the US and those who are in transit, and who hold valid visas, ruling they cannot 
be removed from the US,” and noting that two Massachusetts judges “went further, saying the 
government should notify travelers who would have been affected by the executive order that for the 
next seven days they are free to travel to Boston”). 
  Although some of this litigation will not involve stays of final orders or injunctions, the 
development of the standard for injunctive stays pending appeal could be helpful for these types of 
emergency situations because various procedures share the same standards. See, e.g., Washington v. 
Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017) (temporary restraining order 
preventing enforcement of several sections of Exec. Order No. 13,769); see also Darweesh, 2017 WL 
388504, at *1 (granting emergency motion for stay of removal). 
  A district court noted that there are two potential tests for determining a temporary 
preliminary restraining order of provisions of an executive order, but a number of courts have held that 
the alternative test is inconsistent with a recent Supreme Court opinion. See Washington, 2017 WL 
462040, at *2 (noting the traditional test and an alternative test, the “serious questions” test); infra note 
156 and text accompanying notes 152–156. 
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unable to educate students, and employers without prospective employees in the 
country. At the time of writing, the matter is still very much in flux and 
conflicting predictions and pronouncements abound.49 
Drinking Water. Whether a court grants or denies a stay can also mean the 
difference between safe drinking water for the public and $10.5 million in extra 
monthly costs to a city.50 In 2016, a district court ordered city officials and 
operators of the Flint, Michigan water system to provide safe drinking water to 
residents.51 Some defendants alleged that denying a stay would cost them $10.5 
million per month to provide daily delivery of bottled water.52 But, if a court had 
granted a stay, some residents would not have had access to safe drinking 
water.53 
Elections and Voting. How a court rules on a stay motion for an order 
enjoining election regulations can decide who is eligible to vote, whether states 
can enforce regulations to prevent voter fraud, and, perhaps, even the outcome 
of the election. For stay determinations regarding election regulations, “there can 
be no do-over and no redress.”54 
In Frank v. Walker,55 the Seventh Circuit decided whether to grant a stay 
of an order preventing enforcement of new Wisconsin voter identification 
requirements. Granting the stay would have resulted in 300,000 registered voters 
becoming ineligible to vote in the upcoming election,56 and thousands of 
absentee ballots would not have met the necessary requirements.57 As the dissent 
noted, the 2010 Wisconsin governor’s race was decided by less than half of the 
number of registered voters who would be disenfranchised by a stay, and one-
 
 49. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Travel Ban and the Supreme Court, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 2, 
2018), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerinsky_the_travel_ban_and_the_supreme_court 
[https://perma.cc/CBN2-XCTE] (noting that no other case on the Supreme Court’s docket is likely to be 
more important than the travel ban case and that a decision is expected by late June 2018); Ariane de 
Vogue, Supreme Court Sets Travel Ban Arguments for Final Day of Term, CNN (Feb. 23, 2018), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/23/politics/supreme-court-travel-ban/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/ER5U-DWRQ]; Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017) 
(“Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States 
by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats”); Federal Judge in Hawaii Expands Block on Trump 
Travel Ban, REUTERS (Oct. 21, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-
court/federal-judge-in-hawaii-expands-block-on-trump-travel-ban-idUSKBN1CQ0MI 
[https://perma.cc/4QW7-TT77]. 
 50. Concerned Pastors for Soc. Action v. Khouri, 844 F.3d 546, 549 (6th Cir. 2016) (calling the 
claim “disingenuous” and opining that the cost would be nowhere near that high). 
 51. Concerned Pastors for Soc. Action v. Khouri, 217 F. Supp. 3d 960, 980 (E.D. Mich. 2016). 
 52. Concerned Pastors for Soc. Action, 844 F.3d at 549 (calling the claim “disingenuous” and 
opining that the cost would be nowhere near that high). 
 53. Concerned Pastors for Soc. Action v. Khouri, 220 F. Supp. 3d 823, 829 (E.D. Mich. 2016). 
 54. Fla. Democratic Party v. Detzner, No. 4:16CV607-MW/CAS, 2016 WL 6090943, at *8 
(N.D. Fla. Oct. 16, 2016) (preliminary injunction) (quoting League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North 
Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 247 (4th Cir. 2014)). 
 55. Frank v. Walker, 769 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). 
 56. Id. at 498 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
 57. Id. at 499. 
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third of that number of registered voters decided the 2010 Wisconsin senatorial 
race.58 Denying the stay would have enjoined the state from “preventing in-
person voter-impersonation fraud and promoting public confidence in the 
integrity of the electoral process.”59 The decision to deny a stay could also have 
required “‘last-minute change[s]’ in election procedures,” which would have 
lead to “chaos” and confusion in the voting process.60 
In a controversial stay determination of particular relevance to this Article, 
the United States Supreme Court stayed the Florida Supreme Court order for the 
Florida recount in the 2000 presidential election,61 which, some say, in effect, 
declared George W. Bush the winner.62 Bush v. Gore63 is, perhaps, the most well-
known US stay opinion. In Bush v. Gore, the United States Supreme Court 
stayed64 the Florida Supreme Court’s order requiring a hand recount of 
approximately 9,000 Miami-Dade County ballots that the ballot-counting 
machines rejected, and the inclusion of any additional legal votes for Gore in the 
statewide vote certifications.65 In dissent, Justice Stevens noted that the stay 
applicants failed to carry their burden because “[c]ounting every legally cast vote 
cannot constitute irreparable harm.”66 Justice Scalia, in his concurrence, 
countered that assertion. Scalia, first, noted that hand-counting the ballots that 
machines had rejected threatened irreparable harm to then-presidential candidate 
Bush because counting those questionable votes and then, later, ruling on the 
legality of those votes would not produce election results required by democratic 
stability.67 Second, if the Court denied the stay and then later determined that the 
recount was unlawful, then the manual recount that may have already occurred 
in the interim would have degraded the ballots, rendering any subsequent lawful 
recount inaccurate.68 Ultimately, the Court stayed the Florida Supreme Court’s 
order for a manual recount, effectively deeming George W. Bush the winner of 
the election. 
 
 58. Id. at 498. 
 59. Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 899 (E.D. Wis.), rev’d, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 60. Frank, 769 F.3d at 496 (quoting plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration and citing Purcell v. 
Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 1 (2006)). 
 61. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000) (mem.). 
 62. Id. at 1047–48 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he entry of the stay would be tantamount to a 
decision on the merits in favor of the applicants.” (quoting Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Skokie, 434 
U.S. 1327, 1328 (1977) (Stevens, J., in chambers))). 
 63. Id. at 1046. 
 64. Bush, 531 U.S. at 1046. 
 65. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1262 (Fla. 2000). 
 66. Bush, 531 U.S. at 1047 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 67. Id. at 1046 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 68. Id. 
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II. 
DEFINING STAYS 
This Article focuses on stays pending appeal in civil matters. It reserves for 
future exploration discussion of various types of claims with separate stay 
doctrine, including bankruptcy, class actions, copyright or patent, damages, 
habeas corpus, criminal matters, stays of arbitration decisions, and stays of 
agency actions or decisions.69 Numerous courts of appeals have separate rules 
for stays of death penalty executions.70 
Unless there is a court order granting a stay, a final judgment in an action 
for an injunction is enforceable, even while an appeal is pending.71 Despite the 
significant and irreversible outcomes for litigants and the public, courts either do 
not apply the stay standard or, when courts do apply the standard, they do not 
apply it consistently. This is a problem because the stakes are high and getting it 
“right” matters. Before explaining the near lawless nature of how courts 
determine whether to grant stays in Part III, this Part describes the standard and 
procedure that ostensibly guide courts as they decide requests for stays pending 
appeal. 
A. Stay Mechanics 
To obtain a stay of a district court’s judgment or order pending appeal, 
typically a losing party must move, first, in the district court for a stay of that 
court’s own order or judgment.72 A party losing a stay determination can later 
 
 69. See, e.g., Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Zoll Med. Corp., 217 F. Supp. 3d 362, 365 (D. Mass. 
2016) (patent); William A. Graham Co. v. Haughey, 794 F. Supp. 2d 566 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (copyright); 
Titan Tire Corp. of Bryan v. Local 890L, United Steelworkers of Am., 673 F. Supp. 2d 588, 590 (N.D. 
Ohio 2009) (arbitration); S.E.C. v. O’Hagan, 901 F. Supp. 1476 (D. Minn. 1995) (criminal); In re 
Neisner Bros., Inc., 10 B.R. 299, 300 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (“[T]he standards governing Rule 62(c) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . are [not] applicable to a ‘normal stay pending appeal’ 
pursuant to Rule 805.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 62(a)(1)–(2) (judgments or orders regarding an action for a 
receivership or that “direct[] an accounting in an action for patent infringement” are not stayed after 
being entered even if a party appeals); FED. R. BANKR. P. 8025 (bankruptcy); FED. R. CRIM. P. 38 
(criminal); 9E AM. JUR. 2D, BANKRUPTCY § 3754 (2017). 
  This Article sets aside stays regarding criminal matters for future exploration in large part 
because of the differences in what is at stake and for whom between (non-habeas) civil and criminal 
matters. Separate rules may also govern stays pending appeals brought within a class action, under Civil 
Rule of Procedure 23(f). See In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 286 F.R.D. 88, 91 
(D.D.C. 2012). 
 70. See 6TH CIR. R. 8; 3D CIR. R. 8. 
 71. FED. R. CIV. P. 62(a)(1). 
 72. See FED. R. APP. P. 8(a)(1). But see Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health 
Servs. v. Abbott, 734 F.3d 406, 410 (5th Cir. 2013) (state made initial stay request to court of appeals 
instead of district court because a stay motion before the district court was impracticable as a final 
injunction of state law would take effect the day after the district court order). A court could also 
“suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction on terms for bond or other terms that secure the 
opposing party’s rights” pending appeal. FED. R. CIV. P. 62(c). That mechanism is not the same as a stay. 
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 428–31 (2009); see Part II.C. A court can, sua sponte, stay its own 
injunctive order pending appeal, but reviewing courts may decline to affirm such a stay except in 
“extreme” circumstances. See Fletcher v. United States, No. 02-CV-427-GKF-PJC, 2016 WL 927196, 
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appeal that determination or submit a new stay request to the court of appeals.73 
Typically, a randomly assigned motions panel of appellate judges would decide 
the request de novo74 by a majority of the panel.75 A party who loses before the 
motions panel can request reconsideration either by the panel or en banc court of 
appeals, which would also typically be de novo.76 To obtain a stay of a court of 
appeals’ judgment or order pending reconsideration, rehearing en banc, or 
pending a writ of certiorari, typically a losing party can request de novo 
reconsideration by the panel or en banc consideration.77 
Litigants who want the Supreme Court to stay a district court’s or appeals 
court’s injunctive judgment or order also must request a stay from a lower court 
first.78 After that, any further request must go to the appropriate circuit justice79 
to prevent justice shopping.80 A single justice can grant or deny the application 
for a stay, vacate a stay, or refer the application for a stay to the full Court.81 
Although the Court is not prone to insert itself in a matter that is still pending in 
a court of appeals unless there are “compelling and unusual circumstances,”82 a 
single justice can grant, deny, reinstate, or vacate a stay for a matter that is 
pending court of appeal review and that is not pending a writ of certiorari. 83 A 
 
at *3–4 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 11, 2016) (amending judgment to eliminate “pre-granted” stay pending 
appeal). 
 73. FED. R. APP. P. 8(a)(2)(A). 
 74. See, e.g., Frank v. Walker, 766 F.3d 755, 756 (7th Cir. 2014) (mem.) (appellate panel 
considered motion for a stay of the district court’s order without referencing the district court opinion or 
deferring to it). But see Voting for Am., Inc. v. Andrade, 488 F. App’x 890, 906 (5th Cir. 2012) 
(reviewing district court’s stay determination for abuse of discretion); Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 73 
F.3d 648, 657 (6th Cir. 1996) (same). 
 75. FED. R. APP. P. 8(a)(2)(D). 
 76. See, e.g., Frank v. Walker, 769 F.3d 494, 495 (7th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See SUP. CT. R. 23(3); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 62(c) (governing requests for civil stays of 
judgments pending appeal in federal district courts); FED. R. APP. P. 8(a) (outlines procedures for stays 
of district courts’ orders or judgments pending appeal.). The Supreme Court procedures for stays 
pending appeal to the Court are the same as those for stays pending writs of certiorari. SUP. CT. R. 23; 
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 28, at 881. 
 79. See SUP. CT. R. 22(3); SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 28, at 872; Gonen, supra 
note 1, at 1172. 
 80. Gonen, supra note 1, at 1173 (“These rules are mainly intended to prevent litigants from 
filing an application with whichever Justice they think will be most likely to rule favorably on their 
application—a practice referred to as ‘Justice shopping.’”). 
 81. See SUP. CT. R. 23(1); 28 U.S.C. § 2101(f) (2012); All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) 
(2012); see also Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426 (2009) (the All Writs Act authorized federal courts 
to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the 
usages and principles of law”); SUP. CT. R. 22(5) (“A Justice to whom an application for a stay or for 
bail is submitted may refer it to the Court for determination.”); SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 
28, at 872–73, 893–94; Gonen, supra note 1, at 1166–68 (2008) (discussing the sources of the Supreme 
Court’s power to grant stays pending appeal). 
 82. SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 28, at 883; see Heckler v. Lopez, 463 U.S. 1328 
(1983) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers). 
 83. SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 28, at 881–82; SUP. CT. R. 23. 
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justice can also refer an application regarding a stay pending court of appeal 
review to the full Court.84 
Justices give great deference to district court and court of appeals stay 
determinations when the matters are still pending before a court of appeals.85 
Referrals to the full Court are typically reserved only for specific complex or 
controversial questions, and the Court makes stay determinations by majority 
decision.86 Deciding as individuals, justices often put aside their own views and, 
instead, predict or find out through informal means the view of the full Court.87 
If the circuit justice denies the request for a stay, the applicant can renew the 
application by reapplying to another justice.88 At this point, justice shopping 
could be the norm,89 but the Court disfavors renewals,90 and typically individual 
justices refer renewals to the full Court.91 The Court almost never grants a 
renewed application for a stay.92 
 
 84. SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 28, at 881–84 (citing to instances of individual 
Justices referring such requests to the full Court). 
 85. See Fargo Women’s Health Org. v. Schafer, 507 U.S. 1013, 1014 (1993) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (mem.) (“When a matter is pending before a court of appeals, it long has been the practice 
of members of this Court to grant stay applications only ‘upon the weightiest considerations.’” (quoting 
O’Rourke v. Levine, 80 S. Ct. 623, 624 (1960) (Harlan, J., in chambers))); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto 
Co., 463 U.S. 1315, 1316 (1983) (“[A] district court’s conclusion that a stay is unwarranted is entitled 
to considerable deference.”). 
 86. Gonen, supra note 1, at 1173. Circuit justices referred to the full Court many, if not all, of 
the most controversial stay determinations of the past few terms. See supra Part II.A. 
 87. See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304, 1313 (1973) (Marshall, J., in chambers); 
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 28, at 873 (“[T]he practice and procedure are largely in terms 
of individual action by the various Justices. . . . A number of the Justices have emphasized that when 
they act in their capacity as Circuit Justices they act primarily as a spokesperson or ‘surrogate’ for the 
entire Court.”); Id. at 896 (“[A] Justice may contact other members of the Court who are available in 
person or by telephone and ascertain their views without formally submitting or referring the application 
to the entire Court, particularly when the Court is not in session.”); Gonen, supra note 1, at 1174. 
 88. SUP. CT. R. 22(4). 
 89. Because parties can submit their renewed application to any justice of their choosing, it 
follows that parties would aim to submit renewed applications to the justice most likely to grant their 
request. 
 90. SUP. CT. R. 22(4); see SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 28, at 891 (“[T]he Justices 
are reluctant to encourage such shopping around by granting what has already been denied, and rarely 
grant such applications.”). 
 91. SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 28, at 876 (“The general policy is to refer the 
renewed application to the full Court for action unless time does not permit . . . .”); Id. at 892 (“[I]t is 
also the present practice for the Justice to whom a resubmission has been transmitted to refer the 
application to the entire Court for action.”). 
 92. See id. at 892 (“Almost uniformly the reapplications have been denied.”); Gonen, supra note 
1, at 1177; see also SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 28, at 897 (noting that the Court is unlikely 
to review or reverse an individual Justice’s stay determination except “in the most extraordinary 
circumstances”). 
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Justices usually decide stays solely on the submitted papers.93 Individual 
justices, acting as circuit justices, typically consider stay determinations to be 
“in-chambers” work.94 Yet justices very rarely write in-chambers opinions.95 
Because parties may ordinarily enforce injunctive orders or judgments 
immediately, courts often try to decide motions for stays pending appeal rather 
quickly. Justices often review stay applications for only a matter of minutes and 
decide even more complex applications within twenty-four hours.96 Circuit and 
district court judges also often review and decide motions for stays within a short 
period of time.97 
Stays pending appeal typically terminate when a court completes its 
review.98 For example, a stay granted by an individual justice typically has effect 
only until the Court decides whether to grant certiorari.99 If the Court does grant 
certiorari, then any stay would typically end with the Court’s decision on the 
case.100 
B. The Standard for Determining Stays 
When determining stays of injunctive orders101 pending appeal, federal 
courts ostensibly consider the factors enumerated in Hilton v. Braunskill:102 
 
 93. SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 28, at 876 (Court rules do not provide for oral 
argument for stay applications; the last hearing on a stay application was in 1980). Courts of Appeals 
may hold hearings on stay motions more often than the Supreme Court does, but still usually decide stay 
motions on the papers. See supra notes 74 and 79. But see, e.g., Frank v. Walker, 769 F.3d 494, 495 (7th 
Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (noting that the court heard oral argument). 
 94. SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 28, at 873–74. 
 95. Id. at 874. 
 96. See Gonen, supra note 1, at 1173 n.95 (citing ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT 
PRACTICE § 17.2, at 850 (9th ed. 2007) (“Justices often deny applications within 24 hours after they are 
filed.”)). 
 97. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 
583, 588 (5th Cir. 2014) (court responded to emergency stay motion “[w]ithin forty-eight hours”); 
Russell v. Lundergan-Grimes, 769 F.3d 919, 920 (6th Cir. 2014) (deciding motion for stay three days 
after district court issued injunction against enforcing an electioneering statute three weeks before 
election). 
  Federal courts sometimes employ a two-stage strategy for making stay determinations. This 
strategy typically entails granting a “temporary stay” or “administrative stay” until the court has time to 
receive or review briefs or to hold oral argument on the motion. See, e.g., In re Chevron Corp., 650 F.3d 
276, 286 (3d Cir. 2011) (granting a temporary stay before hearing oral arguments on the motion for a 
stay pending appeal); Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 638 F.3d 1004, 1005 (8th Cir. 2011) (granting a 
“temporary” or “administrative stay” in order “to give the court sufficient opportunity to consider the 
merits of the motion for a stay pending appeal”) (internal citations omitted). But see Brady, 638 F.3d at 
1005 (Bye, J., dissenting) (opining that courts do not employ a two-step temporary administrative stay 
process for non-emergency stays in the circuit). 
 98. SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 28, at 895–97. 
 99. Id.; see, e.g., Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G., 136 S. Ct. 2442, 2442 (2016) (mem.). 
 100. SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 28, at 897. 
 101. Procedure differs with respect to stays of damages orders. FED. R. CIV. P. 62(a), (d). 
 102. See Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987); see also Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 
434 (2009) (applying four Hilton factors). Courts consider these same, or very similar, factors when 
determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction. See infra Part II.C. 
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(1) whether the movant has demonstrated a likelihood of success 
on the merits; 
(2) whether the movant is likely to suffer irreparable harm if the 
court denies a stay; 
(3) whether the balance of the hardships to the parties counsels in 
favor of issuing a stay;103 and 
(4) where the public interest lies. 
When determining applications for stays pending certiorari, Supreme Court 
justices consider factors that largely accord with those that lower federal courts 
use when determining stays pending appeal requests. For the Supreme Court to 
grant a stay pending certiorari, an applicant must show: 
(1) “a reasonable probability that four Justices will consider the 
issue sufficiently meritorious to grant certiorari”; 
(2) “a fair prospect that a majority of the Court will vote to reverse 
the judgment below”; 
(3) “a likelihood that irreparable harm will result from the denial 
of a stay”; and 
(4) “in close cases it may be appropriate to ‘balance the equities’—
to explore the relative harms to applicant and respondent, as 
well as the interests of the public at large.”104 
The Supreme Court’s approach for determining stays pending certiorari, 
however, differs in at least two key respects from lower federal courts’ approach 
for determining stays pending appeal. First, in contrast to lower federal courts, 
Supreme Court justices consider the probability that the full Court will vote to 
grant certiorari. Second, unlike the standard for stays pending appeal, the Court’s 
 
 103. Federal courts often use language such as “whether issuance of the stay will substantially 
injure the other parties interested in the proceeding” when describing the third factor. See Nken, 556 
U.S. at 426; see also Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1027 (2013); June Med. Servs., LLC v. Gee, 
814 F.3d 319, 323 (5th Cir. 2016), vacated on other grounds, 136 S. Ct. 1354 (2016); Campaign for S. 
Equal. v. Bryant, 773 F.3d 55, 57 (5th Cir. 2014); In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 503 F.3d 
167, 170 (2d Cir. 2007); Republic of Phil. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 658 (3d Cir. 
1991); Wash. Metro. Area Transit Comm’n v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1977); 
Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 781 F.2d 1450, 1453 (11th Cir. 1986). 
  Determining whether a stay will injure other parties and balancing the hardships are 
ostensibly different tasks. Despite using language that only refers to whether there would be harm to 
nonmoving parties if the court were to issue a stay pending appeal, federal courts likely intend this factor 
to also include balancing the equities. See Nken, 556 U.S. at 438 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Under the 
Court’s four-part standard, the [movant] must . . . establish[] that the interests of the parties [] weigh in 
his or her favor.”); Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20, 26–27 (2008) (preliminary 
injunction) (discussing the third factor as whether “the balance of equities tips in [the movant’s] favor” 
and noting “the importance of assessing the balance of equities” while discussing the third factor). 
 104. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (citing Lucas v. Townsend, 486 U.S. 
1301, 1304 (1988) (Kennedy, J., in chambers)); Rostker v. Goldberg, 448 U.S. 1306, 1308 (1980) 
(Brennan, J., in chambers); see Hollingsworth, 558 U.S. at 199 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (suggesting a 
correction to the Court’s description of the fourth consideration for in-chambers stay determinations by 
saying “(4) the balance of the equities (including, the Court should say, possible harm to the public 
interest) favors issuance”); SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 28, at 898–99. 
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standard for stays pending certiorari calls for balancing the relative harms to the 
applicant and respondent, and to the public interest, only in a “close case.”105 
Like lower federal courts, however, the Court has not stated in a stay decision 
that it will not consider these two factors.  
While parties moving for stays pending appeal or certiorari have the burden 
of demonstrating that the four factors warrant granting a stay,106 two factors stand 
out as particularly important. First, courts consider the likelihood of success to 
be one of the two “most critical” factors in determining stays pending appeal.107 
To demonstrate likelihood of success upon review, the movant must make “a 
strong showing that he is likely to succeed.”108 It is not enough for a movant to 
show that the chance of success is only a “mere ‘possibility’” or “better than 
negligible.”109 
Irreparable harm represents the second critical factor for deciding stay 
requests.110 A movant must show that, absent a stay, he or she likely will be 
irreparably injured pending appeal. A harm is irreparable if any other available 
remedy, such as compensatory or corrective relief, will be insufficient.111 
 
 105. Rostker, 448 U.S. at 1308 (Brennan, J., in chambers). 
 106. See Hollingsworth, 558 U.S. at 190; Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 496, 498 (9th Cir. 2014) (per 
curiam) (marriage); Bos. Taxi Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Boston, 187 F. Supp. 3d 339, 341–42 (D. Mass. 
2016); Rosenbrahn v. Daugaard, 61 F. Supp. 3d 862, 876–77 (D.S.D. 2015), aff’d, 799 F.3d 918 (8th 
Cir. 2015); Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 884 F. Supp. 2d 108, 122 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 107. Nken, 556 U.S. at 434 (“The first two factors of the traditional standard are the most 
critical.”); Barber v. Bryant, 833 F.3d 510, 511 (5th Cir. 2016); Candelario-Del Moral v. UBS Fin. Servs. 
Inc. of P.R., 290 F.R.D. 336, 345 (D.P.R. 2013), as corrected (May 8, 2013), aff’d sub nom. In re Efron, 
746 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2014); Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 884 F. Supp. 2d at 122; Friendship Edison Pub. 
Charter Sch. Collegiate Campus v. Nesbitt, 704 F. Supp. 2d 50, 51–52 (D.D.C. 2010); KSTU, LLC v. 
Aereo, Inc., No. 14-4020, 2014 WL 1687749, at *1 (10th Cir. Mar. 7, 2014). 
 108. Nken, 556 U.S. at 426 (2009) (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)). 
 109. Id. at 434 (“It is not enough that the chance of success on the merits simply be ‘better than 
negligible. . . . [M]ore than a mere ‘possibility’ of relief is required.” (quoting Sofinet v. INS, 188 F.3d 
703, 707 (C.A.7 1999))); Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 779 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1046–47 (D. Minn. 
2011) (stay of preliminary injunction) (declining to adopt the “not wholly without doubt” standard for 
the likelihood of success factor, the court noted that the National Football League urged a “not wholly 
without doubt” standard, under which applicants meet the likelihood of success requirement if there is 
“any possibility of success on the merits”). 
 110.  See Nken, 556 U.S. at 434 (describing irreparable harm as one of the two “most critical” 
factors). 
 111. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 505 U.S. 1301, 1302 (1992) (Stevens, 
J.) (preliminary injunction) (granting stay where “a decent respect for the incomparable importance of 
winning a gold medal in the Olympic Games convinces me that a pecuniary award is not an adequate 
substitute for the intangible values for which the world’s greatest athletes compete”). 
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The third factor that courts consider is balancing the harm to the movants 
against any harm to other parties.112 Courts compare and “determine on which 
side the risk of irreparable injury weighs most heavily.”113 
Finally, federal courts consider the impact that the stay, or lack thereof, will 
have on people beyond the parties while appeal is pending.114 Courts have 
recognized many public interests relevant to this fourth factor, such as public 
health and safety and notice of voting procedures.115 In practice, however, courts 
do not always consider the public interest when determining stays.116 
C. Stays Pending Appeal in Context and in Comparison 
Although the procedural posture of stays pending appeal differs 
significantly from that of preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining 
orders, federal courts treat these three procedural mechanisms similarly. This 
difference in procedural postures between stays pending appeal and preliminary 
mechanisms suggests that, even if courts use similar factors for evaluating each 
mechanism, courts should weigh those factors differently when determining 
stays.117 To stay a fully informed and reasoned order or judgment pending 
appeal, courts should require a showing at least as strong as what they require 
for a preliminary mechanism such as preliminary injunctions or temporary 
restraining orders.118 Perhaps the import of this difference in procedural postures 
 
 112. See SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 28, at 900 (“Even if the applicant can 
demonstrate irreparable injury, that harm must be balanced against the injury to other parties to the 
case . . . .”). 
 113. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304, 1309 (1973) (Marshall, J., in chambers). Balancing 
the hardships to the parties also played a key role in the Bush v. Gore stay determination. The dissent 
noted that the applicants did not demonstrate the likelihood of irreparable harm, but that there was “a 
danger that a stay may cause irreparable harm to respondents . . . because of the risk that ‘the entry of 
the stay would be tantamount to a decision on the merits in favor of the applicants.’” Bush v. Gore, 531 
U.S. 1046, 1047–48 (2000) (mem.) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting National Socialist Party of Am. v. 
Skokie, 434 U.S. 1327, 1328 (1977) (Stevens, J., in chambers)). 
 114. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009) (characterizing inquiry as “where the public 
interest lies” (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987))). 
 115. See, e.g., Purcell v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (recognizing public interest in avoiding 
“voter confusion”); United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 988, 990 (D.D.C. 2006) 
(recognizing public interest in knowledge of health risks associated with smoking). 
 116. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 448 U.S. 1306, 1308 (1980) (Brennan, J., in chambers) (the 
Supreme Court’s standard for in-chambers determinations of applications for stays pending appeal or 
certiorari notes only that it “may be appropriate” to consider the public interest “in a close case”). But 
see SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 28, at 900 (suggesting that the Court does seem to consider 
the public interest when an applicant demonstrates irreparable harm). 
 117. See United States v. Omega Sols., LLC, 889 F. Supp. 2d 945, 948 (E.D. Mich. 2012) 
(“Though the factors are the same for both a preliminary injunction and a stay pending appeal, the 
balancing process is not identical due to the different procedural postures.” (citing Mich. Coal. of 
Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 945 F.2d 150, 153 (6th Cir. 1991))). 
 118. See Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 890 F. Supp. 2d 688, 692–
93 (S.D. W. Va. 2012) (“At this point, the merits of Plaintiffs’ case have already been considered, and 
Plaintiffs have lost. . . . With this in mind, it would be problematic and unfair to allow Plaintiffs to further 
delay based on a showing much lower than that required for them to have received a preliminary 
injunction in the first place.”); Gotanda, supra note 20, at 812 (“The rationale for imposing on the 
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for stays as opposed to preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders 
has gone unnoticed because courts and scholars have yet to evaluate the 
purposes, standards, and stakes of stays pending appeal, despite vast scholarly 
literatures on injunctions and temporary restraining orders.119 
Stays are similar to injunctions and restraining orders in some respects. For 
example, stays, injunctions, and restraining orders can have comparable 
effects—”preventing some action before the legality of that action has been 
conclusively determined.”120 The mechanisms also share similar standards.121 
Despite these similarities, the mechanisms differ in meaningful ways.122 
First, stays differ functionally from injunctions or restraining orders.123 By 
issuing injunctions—whether preliminary or final—courts employ their coercive 
powers to tell a party “what to do or not to do.”124 Conversely, by issuing stays—
largely regardless of the type of stay—courts do not tell any actor what to do, 
but, instead, temporarily suspend the enforceability of an order.125 As a result, to 
 
movant a heavier burden is that the motion for a stay has already received full consideration by the trial 
judge.”). 
 119. See, e.g., RENDLEMAN, supra note 20, at 528; FISS, INJUNCTION 11, supra note 20; Lynch, 
supra note 20, at 779. 
 120.  Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 428 (2009). 
 121. Compare eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (“[A] plaintiff 
seeking a permanent injunction must . . . demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) 
that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; 
(3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is 
warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”), with 
Nken, 556 U.S. at 434 (noting that the issuance of a stay requires consideration of four factors: “(1) 
whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) 
whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will 
substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies”) 
(quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)); see also supra Part II.C (explaining that courts 
often decide preliminary or interlocutory injunctions based on the four stay factors). 
 122. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 507 U.S. 1301, 1302 (1993) (“[A]pplicants are not 
merely seeking a stay of a lower court’s order, but an injunction against the enforcement of a 
presumptively valid Act of Congress. Unlike a stay, which temporarily suspends ‘judicial alteration of 
the status quo,’ an injunction ‘grants judicial intervention that has been withheld by the lower courts.’” 
(citing Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy, Inc. v. NRC, 479 U.S. 1312, 1313 (1986) (Scalia, J., in 
chambers))); FED. R. APP. P. 8(a)(1) (separating out “a stay of the judgment or order of a district court 
pending appeal” as a type of relief apart from “an order suspending, modifying, restoring, or granting 
an injunction while an appeal is pending”); FED. R. CIV. P. 62(b) and (c) (separating out “Stay Pending 
the Disposition of a Motion . . . for relief from a judgment or order” from “Injunction Pending an 
Appeal”). 
 123. See, e.g., Nken, 556 U.S. at 430–31 (distinguishing between stays and injunctions in the 
removal context because, among other reasons, Congress limited the availability of injunctions in 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(f) (2012), titled “Limit on injunctive relief,” and treated stays separately in 
§ 1252(b)(3)(B), titled “Stay of order”). 
 124. Nken, 556 U.S. at 428 (“defining ‘injunction’ as ‘[a] court order prohibiting someone from 
doing some specified act or commanding someone to undo some wrong or injury’” (quoting BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 784 (6th ed.1990))). See also id. (“[T]he order is directed at someone, and governs 
that party’s conduct.”). 
 125. Id. (“defining ‘stay’ as ‘a suspension of the case or some designated proceedings within it.’” 
(quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1413)). 
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the extent courts require different levels of justification for the mechanisms, 
justices have noted that a request for an injunction “demands a significantly 
higher justification” than a request for a stay.126 
Stays of final orders or judgments pending appeal also differ notably from 
preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders in terms of the 
requirements imposed on the court and parties. As noted above, courts consider 
similar factors in determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction or a 
stay.127 Yet, the federal rules prescribe different requirements for stays pending 
appeal than they do for preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining 
orders.128 For example, whenever a court issues a temporary restraining order 
without notice to a party, the order must “describe the injury and state why it is 
irreparable,”129 but a court need not describe a stay decision.130 In fact, “[e]very 
order granting an injunction and every restraining order must . . . state the reasons 
why it issued.”131 No federal court ever has to state the reasons why it granted or 
denied a motion or application for a stay.132 In addition, a court may issue a 
preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order only if the movant gives 
security,133 but movants may not obtain stays of injunctive judgments pending 
appeal by posting a bond.134 
Last, the procedural posture of stays differs significantly from that of 
preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders. Once a non-
interlocutory appeal is pending, “the merits of the underlying case [to the extent 
that they are relevant to a final order or judgment] have already been decided 
upon by a court, unlike when a party is seeking a preliminary injunction” or 
temporary restraining order.135 “[T]here is a reduced probability of error, at least 
with respect to a court’s findings of fact, because the district court had the benefit 
 
 126. See Respect Me. PAC v. McKee, 131 S. Ct. 445, 445 (2010) (mem.) (quoting Ohio Citizens, 
479 U.S. at 1313 (Scalia, J., in chambers)). Individual justices have historically echoed this view. See 
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 28, at 879. 
 127. See Nken, 556 U.S. at 434 (noting “substantial overlap” between stay and preliminary 
injunction factors); Gotanda, supra note 20, at 812. 
 128. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 62(c) (prescribing procedures for injunctive stays pending appeal), 
and FED. R. APP. P. 8(a) (same), with FED. R. CIV. P. 65 (prescribing procedures for preliminary 
injunctions and temporary restraining orders). 
 129. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(2). 
 130. See FED. R. CIV. P. 62(c); FED. R. APP. P. 8(a). This difference may be due to the potential 
ex parte nature of the temporary restraining order, but it is a difference nonetheless. 
 131. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(1)(A). 
 132. See FED. R. CIV. P. 62(c); FED. R. APP. P. 8(a); SUP. CT. R. 22–23. 
 133. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c) (excluded from this requirement are the “United States, its officers, 
and its agencies”). 
 134. FED. R. CIV. P. 62(a), (d). 
 135. Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs., 890 F. Supp. 2d 688, 691 
(S.D. W. Va. 2012) (citing Blackwelder Furniture Co. of Statesville v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189, 
194 (4th Cir.1977)); see also United States v. Omega Sols., LLC, 889 F. Supp. 2d 945, 948 (E.D. Mich. 
2012) (“A motion for stay pending appeal is made after significant factual development and after the 
court has fully considered the merits.” (citing Mich. Coal. of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. 
Griepentrog, 945 F.2d 150, 153 (6th Cir. 1991))). 
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of a complete record . . . .”136 In contrast, motions for preliminary injunctions or 
temporary restraining orders are “supported only by limited discovery,” at which 
point, it “seem[s] almost inimical to good judging to hazard a prediction about 
which side is likely to succeed.”137 In sum, courts treat stays pending appeal 
similarly to how they treat preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining 
orders. But the unique procedural posture of stays, to prevent the enforcement of 
a final order or judgment, and their significant irreversible consequences suggest 
that stays require different treatment by courts. 
III. 
A NEARLY LAW-FREE ZONE 
Although there is a standard for stays pending appeal, the area of stays 
pending appeal is a nearly law-free zone. Despite the stays standard and the 
immense consequences that stay decisions can pose for parties, courts apply the 
stay standard inconsistently, if at all. 
A. Inconsistencies in Courts’ Consideration of Stay Factors 
When courts write opinions on stay determinations, the manner in which 
they consider the relevant factors varies widely enough to make prediction of 
future determinations difficult. This leads to uncertainty and potential unfairness 
for parties and less guidance for courts, rendering stays a nearly law-free zone. 
Courts use several approaches for weighing the stay factors, and 
distinctions among the approaches are often less than clear. At least one court of 
appeals requires a stay movant to demonstrate each of the four traditional 
factors.138 Other courts use a balancing approach, weighing the factors “such that 
a stronger showing on some of these prongs can make up for a weaker showing 
on others.”139 The Fourth Circuit applies a “balance-of-hardships” standard, 
 
 136. Griepentrog, 945 F.2d at 153. 
 137. Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v. Jewell, 839 F.3d 1276, 1286 (10th Cir. 2016) 
(quoting All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1139–40 (9th Cir. 2011) (Mosman, J., 
concurring)); see also Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981): 
The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties 
until a trial on the merits can be held. Given this limited purpose and the haste that is often 
necessary to preserve those positions, a court customarily grants a preliminary injunction on 
the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on 
the merits. 
 138. See Feldman v. Ariz. Sec’y of State’s Office, 843 F.3d 366, 375 (9th Cir. 2016) (“A plaintiff 
must make a showing as to each of these elements . . . .”). 
 139. Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc., 890 F. Supp. 2d at 692 (citing 16A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT 
& ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3954 (4th ed. 2012)); see also 
Concerned Pastors for Soc. Action v. Khouri, 844 F.3d 546, 548–49 (6th Cir. 2016) (denying stay of 
preliminary injunction based primarily on the relative risk of irreparable harm to each party); Davis v. 
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1291–92 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (affirming denial of preliminary 
injunction); Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop. v. John Hancock Life Ins., 582 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 
2009); Concerned Pastors for Soc. Action v. Khouri, 220 F. Supp. 3d 823, 827 (E.D. Mich. 2016) 
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which is, perhaps, a version of the balancing approach.140 This requires “that the 
likelihood-of-success requirement be considered, if at all, only after a balancing 
of hardships is conducted and then only under the relaxed standard of showing 
that ‘grave or serious questions are presented’ for litigation.”141 
Perhaps yet another variation of the balancing approach is a “sliding scale” 
between the first two factors such that “a strong showing that the applicant is 
likely to succeed [on the merits] excuses a weaker showing of irreparable 
injury”142 and vice versa.143 Some courts hold that the movant must always 
demonstrate that both factors are satisfied;144 others do not require both 
factors,145 and still others are unsure what they should require.146 
There is yet another approach, often called the “serious questions” 
approach, under which a court may grant a stay where a movant is not likely to 
succeed on the merits of the appeal, if the movant demonstrates “serious 
questions going to the merits.”147 Some courts use what is perhaps a subset of 
 
(denying stay of preliminary injunction); Omega Sols., LLC, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 948. See generally 
Gotanda, supra note 20, at 819–22 (identifying four approaches for weighing stay factors). 
 140. Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc., 890 F. Supp. 2d at 691–93. 
 141. Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 575 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2009), 
vacated, 559 U.S. 1089 (2010), and aff’d in part, 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (quoting 
Blackwelder Furniture Co. of Statesville v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189, 195–96 (4th Cir.1977)). 
 142. See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 884 F. Supp. 2d 108, 122 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012); see also Hizam v. Clinton, No. 11 CIV. 7693 JCF, 2012 WL 4220498, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 20, 2012) (citing Mohammed v. Reno, 309 F.3d 95, 101 (2d Cir. 2002)). 
 143. See Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334–35 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Mohammed, 309 F.3d 
at 101; Mich. Coal. of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 945 F.2d 150, 153 (6th Cir. 
1991)); Cuomo v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 772 F.2d 972, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Frank v. 
Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 890 (E.D. Wis. 2014), rev’d on other grounds, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(citing In re A & F Enters., Inc. II, 742 F.3d 763, 766 (7th Cir. 2014)). Some courts allow demonstration 
of “serious questions going to the merits” as a weaker, but acceptable, showing of likelihood of success 
when “the balance of hardships tips sharply in the applicant’s favor.” CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n v. 
Berkeley, 158 F. Supp. 3d 897, 900 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (quoting Stormans Inc. v. Selecky, 526 F.3d 406, 
412 (9th Cir. 2008)); see also Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting All. for 
the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 2011)); Standard Havens Prod., Inc. v. 
Gencor Indus., Inc., 897 F.2d 511, 512–13 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Turner Const. Co. v. United States, 94 Fed. 
Cl. 586, 590 (Fed. Cl. 2010) (quoting Standard Havens Prods., 897 F.2d at 513); Akiachak Native Cmty. 
v. Jewell, 995 F. Supp. 2d 7, 12–13 (D.D.C. 2014) (citing Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 392 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011); Guttenberg v. Emery, 26 F. Supp. 3d 88 (D.D.C. 2014); Kingman Park Civic Ass’n v. Gray, 
956 F. Supp. 2d 230 (D.D.C. 2013); All. for the Wild Rockies v. Kruger, 35 F. Supp. 3d 1259, 1266 (D. 
Mont. 2014) (quoting Cottrell, 632 F.3d at 1134–35). But see, e.g., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. 
v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 13-1144, 2013 WL 1277419, at *1–2 (3d Cir. 
Feb. 8, 2013) (declining to adopt the sliding scale approach). 
 144. See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council, 884 F. Supp. at 122; Hizam, 2012 WL 4220498, at *3; 
Turner Const. Co., 94 Fed. Cl. at 590. 
 145. See, e.g., Lair v. Bullock, 697 F.3d 1200, 1204 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Leiva-Perez, 640 
F.3d at 966, 968). 
 146. See, e.g., League of Women Voters of United States v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 
2016); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 25 n.31 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated on other grounds, 800 
F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Akiachak Native Cmty., 995 F. Supp. 2d at 12–13; Kingman Park Civic 
Ass’n, 956 F. Supp. 2d at 241; Guttenberg, 2014 WL 1100982, at *8–9. 
 147. See Griepentrog, 945 F.2d at 154 (quoting In re DeLorean Motor Co., 755 F.2d 1223, 1229 
(6th Cir. 1985)); see also Leiva-Perez, 640 F.3d at 966 (concluding that the “serious questions” approach 
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the “serious questions” analysis, noting that the stay movant need not “show a 
‘probability’ of success on the merits” if the movant demonstrates that “the 
balance of the equities weighs heavily in favor of granting the stay” on appeal of 
a “serious legal question.”148 This means that it is possible that a movant may 
only need to demonstrate “the three ‘harm’ factors”: irreparable harm, balance 
of the hardships, and the public interest.149 
Understandably, some courts are confused about how to consider the four 
factors.150 This confusion is not due to benign circuit splits or federal courts 
 
survives Winter in the context of stays of removal); Dodds v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 845 F.3d 217, 221 
(6th Cir. 2016) (granting a stay of preliminary injunction for restrooms for transgender student); Bos. 
Taxi Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Boston, 187 F. Supp. 3d 339, 341–42 (D. Mass. 2016) (“Defendant ‘need 
not persuade the court that is it [sic] likely to be reversed on appeal,’ but the appeal must ‘raise serious 
and difficult questions of law in an area where the law is somewhat unclear.’” (quoting Canterbury 
Liquors & Pantry v. Sullivan, 999 F.Supp. 144, 150 (D.Mass.1998)); Concerned Pastors for Soc. Action, 
220 F. Supp. 3d at 827 (drinking water); United States v. Omega Sols., LLC, 889 F. Supp. 2d 945, 948 
(E.D. Mich. 2012) (noting that a “a stay may be granted with . . . serious questions going to the merits 
and ‘irreparable harm which decidedly outweighs any potential harm to the defendant if a stay is issued” 
(quoting Ohio ex rel. Celebrezze, 812 F.2d 228, 290 (6th Cir. 1987)); Rosenbrahn v. Daugaard, 61 F. 
Supp. 3d 862, 876–77 (D.S.D. 2015), aff’d, 799 F.3d 918 (8th Cir. 2015) (marriage); Sweeney v. Bond, 
519 F. Supp. 124, 132 (E.D. Mo. 1981), aff’d, 669 F.2d 542 (8th Cir. 1982) (“[T]rial courts have issued 
or stayed injunctions pending appeal . . . where the legal questions were substantial and matters of first 
impression.” (citing Mesabi Iron Co. v. Reserve Mining Co., 268 F.2d 782, 783 (8th Cir. 1959))). 
 148. United States v. Transocean Deepwater Drilling, Inc., 537 F. App’x 358, 360–61 (5th Cir. 
2013) (quoting Ruiz v. Estelle (Ruiz I), 650 F.2d 555, 562 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam)); see also 
Campaign for S. Equal. v. Bryant, 773 F.3d 55, 57 (5th Cir. 2014) (staying preliminary injunction) 
(marriage); CRAssociates, Inc. v. United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 23, 24–25 (Fed. Cl. 2012); Loving v. 
Internal Revenue Serv., 920 F. Supp. 2d 108, 110 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting CREW v. Office of Admin., 
593 F.Supp.2d 156, 160 (D.D.C. 2009)); Patino v. Pasadena, 229 F. Supp. 3d. 582, 585 (S.D. Tex. 2017) 
(discussing election redistricting after Shelby County); Cowan v. Bolivar Cty Bd. of Educ., No. 2:65-
CV-00031-DMB, 2016 WL 5462820, at *3 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 29, 2016) (discussing desegregation in 
schools); In re Bracha Found., No. 2:15-MC-748-KOB, 2015 WL 6828677, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 6, 
2015) (noting that a stay movant may “have his motion granted upon a lesser showing of a ‘substantial 
case on the merits’ when ‘the balance of the equities [identified in factors 2, 3, and 4] weighs heavily in 
favor of granting the stay’” (quoting Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 781 F.2d 1450, 1453 (11th Cir. 1986) 
(quoting Ruiz v. Estelle, 650 F.2d 555, 565 (5th Cir. 1981)))); Searcy v. Strange, No. CIV.A. 14-0208-
CG-N, 2015 WL 328825, at *1 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 25, 2015) (marriage) (quoting Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 781 
F.2d 1450, 1453 (11th Cir. 1986)). 
 149. See FTC v. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc., 345 F.3d 850, 852–53 (10th Cir. 2003) (allowing 
a “relaxed” review of “probability of success” when the other harm factors “decidedly” weigh in the 
moving party’s favor). 
 150. See infra note 155. Also consider, for example, the Fourth Circuit and its district courts, in 
which some judges use a “balance-of-hardship” test. See, e.g., supra notes 147–149; Real Truth About 
Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 575 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that Winter precludes 
the use of the “balance-of-hardship” test for preliminary injunctions). Yet, other opinions in the same 
circuit hold that neither the “balance-of-hardships” test nor Winter apply to stays pending appeal. See 
infra notes 156-158; Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs., 890 F. Supp. 2d 688, 
692 (S.D. W. Va. 2012). It is somewhat puzzling that the Ohio Valley Environmental Coal court held 
that stays pending appeal do not require an independent showing of each of the four factors even though 
the court noted that, under Blackwelder (which Fourth Circuit judges recognize as the source of the 
“balance-of-hardships” test) the standard for granting a stay pending appeal is more demanding than that 
for granting a preliminary injunction and, pursuant to Winter, preliminary injunctions require 
independent showings of each of the four factors. See Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. Inc., 890 F. Supp. 2d at 
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serving as laboratories of democracy.151 Instead, this confusion can lead to courts 
continuing to employ approaches for years that the Supreme Court has held 
impermissibly deviate from the “frequently reiterated standard.”152 The risk that 
courts’ approaches conflict with the stays standard is particularly high for courts 
that use a sliding scale or serious-questions analysis to analyze the standard for 
stays after Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council.153 In Winter, the Court 
overruled the Ninth Circuit’s preliminary injunction test under which courts 
grant preliminary injunctions to movants with a strong likelihood of prevailing 
even if they demonstrate only a possibility of irreparable harm.154 Although 
many courts note that stays pending appeal and preliminary injunctions share the 
same standard, some courts have not yet determined whether the sliding scale or 
serious-questions approaches, as applied in determining stays pending appeal, 
survive Winter.155 
Adding confusion to chaos, a number of courts have held that the serious-
questions approach, the serious legal questions plus balance of equities approach, 
and maybe any sliding scale approach, do not survive Winter.156 And some courts 
use two or three terms out of the terms “sliding scale,” “serious questions,” and 
 
690–92 (identifying the critical quandary about “how the ‘likelihood of success’ factor is applied: is it a 
literal requirement or may a stay be granted where success on appeal is unlikely but the other factors are 
met?”). 
 151. See generally New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (noting the Court’s 
important role in preserving the states’ power to “remould, through experimentation, our . . . institutions 
to meet changing social and economic needs”). 
 152. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20, 22 (2008). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See, e.g., League of Women Voters of United States v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 
2016) (noting that the court “has not yet needed to decide” whether Winter requires abandoning the 
“sliding-scale” approach); Revel AC, Inc. v. IDEA Boardwalk LLC, 802 F.3d 558, 569–71 (3d Cir. 
2015) (noting that the court views the sliding scale approach favorably); Lair v. Bullock, 697 F.3d 1200, 
1204 n.2 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting overlap between factors for stays and preliminary injunctions, but not 
deciding whether Winter applies to stays pending appeal); CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n v. Berkeley, 158 
F. Supp. 3d 897, 900 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (applying sliding scale approach after Winter without mentioning 
Winter); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 25 n.31 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated on other grounds, 800 
F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“[O]ur Circuit ‘has suggested, without deciding, that Winter should be read 
to abandon the sliding-scale analysis in favor of a ‘more demanding burden’ requiring Plaintiffs to 
independently demonstrate both a likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm.’” (quoting 
Smith v. Henderson, 944 F.Supp.2d 89, 95 (D.D.C. 2013) (internal citations omitted))); Akiachak Native 
Cmty. v. Jewell, 995 F. Supp. 2d 7, 12–13 (D.D.C. 2014) (“Before the Supreme Court decided Winter 
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., the four factors for a stay and injunctive relief were analyzed on a 
sliding scale. Since Winter, however, it is unclear whether the likelihood of success on the merits factor 
is a threshold inquiry that must be addressed before the other factors.” (citing and quoting numerous 
cases in support) (citing Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 392 (D.C. Cir. 2011))). 
 156. See, e.g., Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v. Jewell, 839 F.3d 1276, 1282 (10th 
Cir. 2016); Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 320–21 (4th Cir. 2013). 
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“balancing” interchangeably157 even though there are significant differences in 
how other courts define those tests.158 
Some courts decide stays while disregarding at least one of the four 
traditional factors.159 Other courts decide stays based on factors that are arguably 
outside of the four-prong standard altogether.160 Courts have also articulated stay 
standards that are either difficult to decipher at best or internally inconsistent at 
worst.161 
Such a hazy legal standard for stay determinations by district court and 
circuit judges is deeply troubling, given that the courts often make such 
determinations hastily and that they pose such serious consequences for 
litigants.162 This confusing collection of weights, or lack thereof, that courts give 
to the traditional stay factors means, in some ways, that there is no standard for 
stays. 
 
 157. See League of Women Voters, 838 F.3d at 7 (equating sliding scale and balancing); Standard 
Havens Prod., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 897 F.2d 511, 512–13 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (equating sliding scale, 
serious questions, and balancing); Akiachak Native Cmty., 995 F. Supp. 2d at 12–13 (equating sliding 
scale analysis with serious question analysis); Friendship Edison Pub. Charter Sch. Collegiate Campus 
v. Nesbitt, 704 F. Supp. 2d 50, 51–52 (D.D.C. 2010) (equating sliding scale with balancing). 
 158. As mentioned above, courts often define “balancing” as weighing the “interrelated 
considerations” of all four factors, Concerned Pastors for Soc. Action v. Khouri, 844 F.3d 546, 548–49 
(6th Cir. 2016) (quoting In re EPA, 803 F.3d 804, 806 (6th Cir. 2015)); “sliding scale” as only balancing 
between the likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm. Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 
837, 890 (E.D. Wis. 2014), rev’d on other grounds, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014); and the “serious 
questions” test much more narrowly as only requiring that the appeal “‘raise serious and difficult 
questions of law in an area where the law is somewhat unclear’” to demonstrate likelihood of success. 
Bos. Taxi Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Boston, 187 F. Supp. 3d 339, 341–42 (D. Mass. 2016) (quoting 
Canterbury Liquors & Pantry v. Sullivan, 999 F. Supp. 144, 150 (D. Mass.1998)). 
 159. See, e.g., Frank v. Walker, 769 F.3d 494, 495–96 (7th Cir. 2014) (not mentioning the second 
or third traditional stay factors); Meyer v. Kalanick, 203 F.Supp.3d 393, 396–97 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) 
(finding no reason to consider the last factor, the public interest.); Wolf v. Walker, 26 F. Supp. 3d 866, 
873 (W.D. Wis. 2014) (disregarding traditional factors in attempt to follow Supreme Court decisions 
without opinions). There is a question regarding whether sliding scale or serious questions analyses are, 
in essence, courts determining stays without requiring movants to meet one or more of the traditional 
stay factors. See supra text accompanying notes 147–156. 
 160. See, e.g., Frank, 769 F.3d at 496 (“A second important consideration is the public interest 
in using laws enacted through the democratic process, until the laws’ validity has been finally 
determined.”); Meyer, 203 F. Supp. 3d at 396 (considering an additional factor, the need for appellate 
clarification on a particular issue); Rosenbrahn v. Daugaard, 61 F. Supp. 3d 862, 877 (D.S.D. 2015), 
aff’d, 799 F.3d 918 (8th Cir. 2015) (staying a judgment because of the “public interest in having stable 
marriage laws[,] avoiding uncertainty produced by a decision that is issued and subsequently stayed by 
an appellate court or overturned,” and maintaining “uniformity and stability of the law”); Brenner v. 
Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1292 (N.D. Fla. 2014), order clarified, No. 4:14CV107-RH/CAS, 2015 
WL 44260 (N.D. Fla. 2015) (considering an additional “substantial public interest in stable marriage 
laws”). 
 161. See Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 890 F. Supp. 2d 688, 
692 (S.D. W. Va. 2012) (“It may be possible that showing somewhat less than a ‘strong showing’ or 
‘likelihood’ of success on the merits can suffice if the harm to the moving party without a stay is great 
enough; however, that showing must be more than merely pointing to ‘serious questions.’”). 
 162. See supra Part I. 
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B. Courts Do Not Write 
Most often, federal courts do not write opinions for stay determinations.163 
There were no written opinions explaining the Supreme Court’s decisions or 
clarifying the stay standards in any of the most pressing stay determinations of 
the past few Court terms.164 The Court is not necessarily more likely to write an 
opinion explaining its stay decision when it reaches a different outcome than the 
district court or court of appeals did after a long and seemingly exhaustive 
discovery process, trial, and opinion on the underlying order.165 On the rare 
occasion that a Justice issues a reasoned opinion in a stay determination, 
moreover, it is most typically in dissent,166 or sometimes in concurrence.167 
Sometimes as many as three or four justices would deny a stay, but none write a 
dissenting opinion explaining their differences in reasoning from the majority.168 
Similarly, courts of appeals tend not to write reasoned, reported, or 
published opinions on stay determinations.169 Compared to the Supreme Court, 
 
 163. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000) (mem.) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[I]t is not 
customary for the Court to issue an opinion in connection with its grant of a stay . . . .”); Republic of 
Phil. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 658 (3d Cir. 1991) (“Because this court ordinarily 
grants or denies a stay pending appeal without opinion, there is little reported authority discussing the 
standard we apply in entering such orders.”); SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 28, at 874 (“The 
Justices write in-chambers opinions only sporadically and selectively. . . . It is rare for more than a 
handful [of in-chambers opinions] to be written during any one term.”). 
 164. See, e.g., Ariz. Sec. of State v. Feldman, 137 S. Ct. 446 (2016) (mem.), staying, 843 F.3d 
366 (9th Cir. 2016) (Arizona law that made it a felony for someone to collect another’s early voting 
ballot); Gloucester Cty. School Bd. v. G.G., 136 S. Ct. 2442, 2442 (2016) (mem.), staying, 822 F.3d 709 
(4th Cir. 2016) (transgender student access to restrooms); Strange v. Searcy, 135 S. Ct. 940 (2015) 
(mem.), denying stay, No. 14-0208, 2015 WL 328825 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 25, 2015) (Alabama marriage 
provisions); Frank v. Walker, 135 S. Ct. 7 (2014) (mem.), vacating, 766 F.3d 755 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(Wisconsin voter identification requirement); Husted v. Ohio State Conference of the NAACP, 135 S. 
Ct. 42 (2014) (mem.), staying, 768 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 2014) (Ohio early voting days); North Carolina v. 
League of Women Voters, 135 S. Ct. 6 (2014) (mem.), staying, 769 F.3d 224 (4th Cir. 2014) (North 
Carolina same-day voter registration and counting of certain provisional ballots); Veasey v. Perry, 135 
S. Ct. 9 (2014) (mem.), denying app. to vacate stay, 769 F.3d 890 (5th Cir. 2014) (Texas voter 
identification requirement); Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 135 S. Ct. 399 (2014) (mem.), granting 
in part and denying in part app. to vacate stay, 769 F.3d 285 (5th Cir. 2014) (Texas abortion provider 
requirements); Herbert v. Kitchen, 134 S. Ct. 893 (2014) (mem.), staying, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. 
Utah 2013) (Utah marriage amendment); Brown v. Plata, 570 U.S. 938 (2013) (mem.), denying stay, 
960 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (California prison population reduction). 
 165. See Plata, 570 U.S. at 938. Plaintiffs convened the Plata three-judge court below after years 
of litigation failed to remedy the constitutional violations in mental health care and medical care, then 
the three-judge court issued its order after a fourteen-day trial in a 184-page opinion. Coleman v. Brown, 
960 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1060 (E.D. Cal. 2013). 
 166. See Strange, 135 S. Ct. at 940–41 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Veasey, 135 S. Ct. at 10–12 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); League of Women Voters, 135 S. Ct. at 6–7 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Frank, 
135 S. Ct. at 7 (Alito, J., dissenting); Plata, 570 U.S. at 938 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 167. See Gloucester Cty. School Bd., 136 S. Ct. at 2442 (2016) (mem.) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 168. See Whole Woman’s Health, 135 S. Ct. at 399; Husted, 135 S. Ct. at 42. 
 169. A Westlaw search in the Third Circuit and the courts within it for recent, reported, civil 
opinions that seem likely to discuss the traditional stay standards for stays pending appeal (using search 
terms “adv: (“stay!” /p (“factor!” or “prong!” or “standard” or “consider!”)) and ATLEAST4(“stay”) 
and (“stay” /p “pending appeal”) and DA(aft 11-12-2008) % debtor % patent % bankruptcy % 
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however, courts of appeals do seem more likely to write reasoned opinions 
explaining their decisions in the most controversial stay determinations of the 
past few years.170 Like the Supreme Court, though, courts of appeals are not 
necessarily more likely to write opinions when their stay decision differs from 
the district court’s after a long and seemingly exhaustive discovery process, trial, 
and opinion on the underlying order.171 Similarly, district courts do not have any 
common practice of writing opinions for decisions regarding stay pending appeal 
requests. 
Courts frequently do not provide reasoning for their stay determinations, 
and when they do, they do not consider the traditional stays factors in a consistent 
manner.172 Court justifications for determining stays pending appeal are often in 
tension with other explanations and, together, the justifications do not fit any 
coherent, purposive theory.173 Despite the potential serious, irreversible 
consequences to injunctive plaintiffs and defendants, stay request outcomes are 
difficult to predict and arbitrary. 
IV. 
A PRINCIPLED BASIS FOR INJUNCTIVE STAYS PENDING APPEAL 
Perhaps courts apply the stay standard inconsistently, if at all, because, at 
present, courts do not have a set of values guiding stay pending appeal decisions. 
For numerous public law issues, a court’s decisions on a stay pending appeal 
request may essentially decide the matters finally.174 Because this context means 
that the stakes are often high and getting it “right” matters, it is important to 
articulate a coherent vision for stays pending appeal. 
 
interlocutory”) provided only ten results on Apr. 2, 2018. A similar Westlaw search with no date 
limitations (“adv: (“stay!” /p (“factor!” or “prong!” or “standard” or “consider!”)) and 
ATLEAST4(“stay”) and (“stay” /p “pending appeal”) % debtor % patent % bankruptcy % 
interlocutory”) provided only sixty-five results on Apr. 2, 2018. See Concerned Pastors for Soc. Action 
v. Khouri, 217 F. Supp. 3d 960 (E.D. Mich. 2016). 
  The same searches in the Tenth Circuit and the courts within it provided only two results 
and only twenty-six results on Apr. 2, 2018. The same searches in the Eleventh Circuit and the courts 
within it provided only nine results and only fifty-one results on Apr. 2, 2018. The same searches in the 
Federal Circuit and the courts within it provided only six results and only sixteen results on Apr. 2, 2018. 
 170. See Frank v. Walker, 769 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 2014) (per curiam); Veasey v. Perry, 769 F.3d 
890 (5th Cir. 2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 2:13-CV-217, 2013 WL 6834634 (D. Utah Dec. 23, 2013); 
Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 769 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2014), vacated in part, 135 S. Ct. 399 
(2014); Ohio State Conference of N.A.A.C.P. v. Husted, 769 F.3d 385 (6th Cir. 2014). But see G.G. v. 
Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 654 F. App’x 606 (4th Cir. 2016) (mem.); Frank v. Walker, 766 F.3d 755 (7th 
Cir. 2014) (mem.). 
 171. See United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., No. 06-5267, 2006 WL 4608645 (D.C. Cir. 
Nov. 1, 2006) (per curiam). The D.C. Circuit granted the stay less than two months after the trial court 
denied a stay, which followed a nine month trial and a 1,700-page opinion on the merits. See United 
States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 988 (D.D.C. 2006) (mem.); United States v. Philip 
Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 172. See supra Part III.A. 
 173. See infra Parts IV.A and B. 
 174. See supra Part I. 
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This Part, descriptively and normatively, suggests a purpose for stays 
pending appeal within which principles of finality limit the exercise of stays. The 
purpose of stays pending appeal should turn on the availability of the right to 
appeal. The standard for stays pending appeal ought to lean toward allowing for 
meaningful appeal where appeal is guaranteed and against staying judgments or 
orders where there is little chance of review. 
This Part describes and then critiques existing potential purposes of stays 
pending appeal. Next, this Part proposes a purpose for stays pending appeal, and, 
to further that purpose, suggests differing standards for stays pending guaranteed 
appeal to lower federal courts versus stays pending petition for discretionary 
review. Finally, this Part proposes that courts should write reasoned opinions for 
stay determinations more often and suggests changes to the substantive standard 
and procedure for stays. 
A. Potential Purposes for Stays Pending Appeal 
Legislators, courts, and commentators have largely left the purpose of stays 
pending appeal for future explication.175 The determination of requests for stays 
needs a purpose, but a four-prong test, without more, does not meet that need. 
Scholars and courts should articulate explicitly the vision of finality and 
appellate hierarchy within which stays operate, just like the vision courts and 
scholars have already articulated for preliminary injunctions.176 To the extent 
that judges or scholars have discussed purposes for preliminary injunctions, 
purposes which could be informative of the purpose of stays, scholars and judges 
have divided into two camps: maintaining the status quo and minimizing costs 
due to error. This Section describes those two potential purposes of stays. 
 
 175. Like all rules of federal civil procedure, the Supreme Court officially promulgates rules for 
federal stays pending appeal. See James C. Duff, Overview for the Bench, Bar, and Public: The Federal 
Rules of Practice and Procedure, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-
rulemaking-process/how-rulemaking-process-works/overview-bench-bar-and-public 
[https://perma.cc/7EE5-WMHV]. The rules for stays pending appeal or certiorari do not contain any 
specific references to their purposes. See FED. R. CIV. APP. P. 8; FED. R. CIV. P. 62(a)(1); SUP. CT. R. 
22, 23. The only legislative history on the federal rules regarding stays merely states that the rules were 
intended to codify the informal practice of the circuit courts. See 20 JAMES WILLIAM MOORE ET AL., 
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 308 app.100 (3d. ed. 2016) (“Appellate Rule 8 codified the former 
informal practice of the circuit courts (see Committee Note to Appellate Rule 8, set out at § 
308App.01[1]).”); id. at § 308 app.01 (describing an appellate court’s Rule 8 power to stay as part of its 
“traditional equipment for the administration of justice”); see also id. (making no further mention of the 
purpose of Rule 8). There is no discussion of the purpose in the legislative history of Rule 62. See 12 
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 62 app.01–07 (describing history of Rule 62). 
 176. See, e.g., FISS, INJUNCTION 11, supra note 20; RENDLEMAN, supra note 20; Lynch, supra 
note 20. 
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1. Maintaining the status quo 
Some courts have cited an interest in maintaining the status quo as a guiding 
principle to determine requests for stays pending appeal.177 The primary purpose 
of maintaining the status quo is typically to preserve the disputed matter and limit 
judicial meddling until the court has time to hold a hearing or issue an order.178 
2. Minimizing error costs 
For preliminary injunctions, which are analogous to stays pending appeal 
in some ways, Judge Richard A. Posner and Professor John Leubsdorf have 
proposed that courts analyze the factors in a way that minimizes error costs.179 
Under this analysis, a court should estimate the likelihood that the movant will 
prevail as a numerical probability and estimate the total irreparable harm to each 
party depending on whether the court grants or denies the preliminary 
injunction.180 By multiplying the likely irreparable harm to the movant by the 
movant’s probability of success and doing the same for the opponent, the court 
can choose to grant or deny the stay based on which determination is most likely 
to cause the least irreparable harm, and, therefore, minimize the cost of error.181 
Posner presented this analysis in a formula: 
𝑃	×	𝐻% > 1 − 𝑃 ×	𝐻),
182 
In other words, a court should grant a preliminary injunction if and only if 
the movant’s likelihood of success at trial or in final judgment (𝑃) multiplied by 
the irreparable harm to the movant if the preliminary injunction is denied (𝐻%) 
is greater than the opponent’s likelihood of success at trial or in final judgment 
1 − 𝑃  multiplied by the irreparable harm to the opponent if the preliminary 
injunction is granted (𝐻)).
183 
B. Critiques of Potential Purposes for Stays Pending Appeal 
This Section critiques the two proposed purposes of stays: maintaining the 
status quo and minimizing costs due to error. 
Maintaining the status quo. Many suggest preserving the status quo as the 
primary purpose for preliminary injunctions, which courts issue before a trial 
 
 177. See, e.g., Veasey v. Perry, 769 F.3d 890, 892 (5th Cir. 2014) (discussing the high value of 
preserving the status quo for a stay pending appeal motion in “a voting case decided on the eve of the 
election”). 
 178. See Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G., 136 S. Ct. 2442, 2442 (2016) (mem.) (Breyer, J., 
concurring); John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525, 535–
36, 546 (1978) (describing a “reluctance to decree burdensome relief without a full hearing that was 
pervading judicial thought on interlocutory remedies”). 
 179. Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prod. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J. 
opinion); Leubsdorf, supra note 178, at 535–36, 546. 
 180. Am. Hosp. Supply Corp., 780 F.2d at 593; Leubsdorf, supra note 178, at 540–41. 
 181. Am. Hosp. Supply Corp., 780 F.2d at 593; Leubsdorf, supra note 178. 
 182. Am. Hosp. Supply Corp., 780 F.2d at 593. 
 183. Id. 
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court has made final determinations.184 However, when a court is determining a 
stay of a permanent order or judgment pending appeal, a court has already made 
its final disposition on the merits and, thus, has already met this purpose. 
Moreover, scholars and courts suggest that preserving the status quo is not the 
purpose of preliminary injunctions either.185 Although maintaining the status quo 
may often preserve the matter for appeal, “[i]t must not be thought . . . that there 
is any particular magic in the phrase ‘status quo.’”186 Maintaining the status quo 
could run counter to what some argue is actually the primary purpose of a 
preliminary injunction: to “prevent irreparable injury so as to preserve the court’s 
ability to render a meaningful decision.”187 Depending on what the primary 
purpose of a stay is, preserving the status quo could run counter to that purpose 
as well. In addition, preserving the status quo is not a practical or desirable 
purpose for stay determinations because it is often unclear what the status to be 
preserved is,188 and, even if the ex ante status is clear, “a court interferes just as 
much when it orders the status quo preserved as when it changes it.”189 
Minimizing error costs. In the area of preliminary injunctions, scholars 
have challenged the goal of minimizing error costs or, perhaps more specifically, 
the suggestion that courts should employ the Posner-Leubsdorf analysis or 
formula.190 Some criticize the difficulty or futility of attempting to quantify the 
 
 184. See, e.g., Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981) (“The purpose of a 
preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits 
can be held.”); DeNovellis v. Shalala, 135 F.3d 58, 74 (1st Cir. 1998) (noting that the purpose of a 
preliminary injunction is “to preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be fairly and fully 
investigated and determined” (quoting Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980))). 
 185. See, e.g., Leubsdorf, supra note 178, at 534, 540, 546 (noting that the roots of the doctrine 
in the 1800’s were to protect the status of possession at common law and to rely on the “undisputed 
exercise of patent rights as prima facie evidence of their validity,” and arguing that preserving the status 
quo in preliminary injunctions is “a habit without a reason” because doing so may inflict irreparable 
injury on the parties); Part IV.B (discussing the judicial and scholarly argument that minimizing error 
costs is the purpose of preliminary injunctions). 
 186. Canal Auth. of State of Fla. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 187. See Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. San Francisco, 512 F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(“Maintaining the status quo is not a talisman.”). See also Callaway, 489 F.2d at 576. 
The purpose of a preliminary injunction is always to prevent irreparable injury so as to preserve 
the court’s ability to render a meaningful decision on the merits. It often happens that this 
purpose is furthered by preservation of the status quo, but not always. If the currently existing 
status quo itself is causing one of the parties irreparable injury, it is necessary to alter the 
situation so as to prevent the injury[.] The focus always must be on prevention of injury by a 
proper order, not merely on preservation of the status quo. 
Id. 
 188. For example, in Whole Woman’s Health, a party could have raised a legitimate question 
about whether preserving the status quo would have meant allowing Texas to enforce its newly enacted 
requirements or allowing abortion providers to continue providing abortions without meeting the 
requirements. 135 S. Ct. 399 (2014) (mem.). 
 189. Leubsdorf, supra note 178, at 546. 
 190. See, e.g., The Honorable David W. Lannetti, The “Test”—Or Lack Thereof—for Issuance 
of Virginia Temporary Injunctions: The Current Uncertainty and a Recommended Approach Based on 
Federal Preliminary Injunction Law, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 273, 291–92 (2015) (“This quantitative 
analysis is neat and compact, but it arguably is simplistic and, in any case, the difficulty—or 
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harms to the parties, including irreparable harms depending on whether a stay is 
granted or denied.191 
Setting the quantification difficulty aside for the sake of argument, there is 
little reason to think that the Posner-Leubsdorf approach for preliminary 
injunctions is a good fit for stays of final civil injunctive orders pending appeal. 
Leubsdorf himself contends that the model to minimize error costs should be 
limited to preliminary injunctions and perhaps other forms of interlocutory relief, 
but should not apply to final injunctions.192 This is due to the procedural posture 
of preliminary injunctions and interlocutory relief, where courts may issue “hasty 
decision[s]” on the basis of “rudimentary hearings”:193 
The dilemma, of course, exists only because the court’s interlocutory 
assessment of the parties’ underlying rights is fallible in the sense that 
it may be different from the decision that ultimately will be reached. The 
danger of incorrect preliminary assessment is the key to the analysis of 
interlocutory relief. It requires investigating the harm an erroneous 
interim decision may cause and trying to minimize that harm. And it 
decisively distinguishes the preliminary from the final injunction.194 
The procedural posture of stays of final orders or judgments pending appeal 
is distinct in at least two ways from that of preliminary injunctions. The first 
difference is that stays of final orders or judgments already have “a reduced 
probability of error”195 because the court issuing the underlying judgment or 
 
impossibility—of assigning numeric values to harms greatly reduces its practical value.“); Linda S. 
Mullenix, Burying (With Kindness) the Felicific Calculus of Civil Procedure, 40 VAND. L. REV. 541 
(1987); Linda J. Silberman, Injunctions by the Numbers: Less Than the Sum of Its Parts, 63 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 279 (1987) (noting that the Posner formula adds to the “confusion and frustration about the 
appropriate substantive standard for the issuance of preliminary injunctions”). But see James L. 
Robertson, Variations on a Theme by Posner: Facing the Factual Component of the Reliability 
Imperative in the Process of Adjudication, 84 MISS. L.J. 471, 598 (2015) (describing Posner’s formula 
as an attempt to fix the reliability problems that follow from unweighted multifactor tests). 
 191. See, e.g., Lannetti, supra note 190, at 291–92; Mullenix, supra note 190; Silberman, supra 
note 190. 
  The case examples noted in Part I raise several questions about quantifying harm. How could 
a judge quickly monetize the harms from Texas being unable to enforce stricter abortion regulations, or 
the harms that women in Texas would likely suffer from fewer and more distant abortion providers? Is 
it the additional cost of transportation to a clinic that is further away? Is it the emotional and financial 
cost of carrying an unwanted pregnancy to term and raising a child? 
  Similarly, what is the cost to couples being unable to marry, or to a state unable to enforce 
marriage regulations? What are the costs to a state unable to enforce voter identification provisions, or 
to voters without required identification unable to vote? What is the cost of a school’s inability to restrict 
bathroom use based on sex listed on birth certificate, or of a transgender student’s multiple suicide 
attempts? See supra Part I. 
 192. Leubsdorf, supra note 178, at 540–41. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Mich. Coal. of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 945 F.2d 150, 153 (6th Cir. 
1991). 
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injunction had the benefit of all necessary time and information from a full 
process or trial, unlike courts issuing preliminary injunctions.196 
The second difference is that, unlike an injunction, a stay does not direct 
the action of any party.197 Instead, a motion for a stay is asking a second-order 
question. When deciding a motion for a stay, a court has already reached a final 
judgment or order and has decided whether to issue an injunction. In the words 
of Leubsdorf, this “decisively distinguishes” a preliminary injunction from a stay 
pending appeal.198 This distinction is decisive because, by deciding whether to 
grant a preliminary injunction, a judge is making a first-order decision, and one 
without the benefit of a trial or complete hearings or briefings. But a judge 
deciding whether to grant a stay should not revisit the first-order question of 
whether the court should issue a final order or a judgment because a court has 
already made that decision with the benefit of all of the information that a court 
determining a preliminary injunction does not have. Instead, a court deciding a 
stay has the benefit of a fully informed prior decision on the outcome of the case. 
Thus, minimizing error cost clearly is not the only or the primary goal of a stay 
pending appeal. 
The absence of an articulated purpose for stays leads to a mish-mashed 
medley of oft-contradictory axioms that can serve as trump cards in stay 
determinations. As a result, federal stays standards are inconsistent and 
unpredictable.199 Because each individual judge may have his or her own way of 
determining stays (and hopefully in each case a judge has reasons for granting 
or denying a stay request), there is little rhyme or reason to how courts decide 
motions for stays pending appeal, even though stays can be irreversibly outcome 
determinative. 
C. A Meaningful Opportunity for Appellate Review 
When courts decide requests for stays pending appeal, they face two 
competing considerations—giving effect to the final order or judgment and 
preserving the opportunity for a meaningful appeal. This is because, even though 
there is a final order or judgment, the litigants are also in the process of a non-
interlocutory appeal. Whether the ability to appeal is required by the Constitution 
or is statutory and pragmatic exceeds the scope of this Article. Regardless, the 
US federal court system provides an opportunity for review at least once in every 
federal civil case. 
 
 196. See supra Part II.C and text accompanying notes 135–137. 
 197. See supra Part II.C and text accompanying notes 124–125. 
 198. Leubsdorf, supra note 178, at 540–41. 
 199. See SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 28, at 899 (noting that it is “essential” that 
lawyers drafting applications for stays are aware of how the different justices treat the stays factors in 
in-chambers opinions, and that “the application for a stay must frankly and fully address them,” even 
though in-chambers opinions may not even discuss the factors); supra Part III.A and B. 
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The goal of a stay pending appeal is to preserve this ability to obtain review. 
Stay determinations should not make this ability to appeal meaningless. A party 
requests a stay pending appeal (or a stay pending application for a writ of 
certiorari) only after any filings, hearing, trials, deliberation, and consideration 
have concluded, and after the court has issued a non-preliminary order or 
judgment that the party is appealing.200 Thus, the primary purpose of stays 
pending appeal should be linked to appellate review of a non-preliminary order 
or judgment. 
1. The civil right to appeal 
The opportunity to have a meaningful appeal, where appeal is guaranteed, 
matters. For federal civil matters, there is generally at least one appeal as of 
right,201 most often from a district court decision to a court of appeals.202 
Historically, courts have guaranteed access to appellate review due to 
fundamental fairness concerns203 and to give courts of appeals an opportunity to 
 
 200. See supra Part II. 
 201. See ROBERT LEFLAR, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES OF APPELLATE COURTS 4, 9–
10 (1976); Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE L.J. 62, 
62 (1985); Geoffrey Hazard, After the Trial Court—the Realities of Appellate Review, in THE COURTS, 
THE PUBLIC, AND THE LAW EXPLOSION 60, 78 (Harry W. Jones ed., 1965) (discussing “settled 
procedural rights or opportunities, such as the generally accorded right to at least one appeal”); 
Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Right to Appeal, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1219, 1222 (2013). 
 202. See Dalton, supra note 201, at 62 n.5 (“Justice Rehnquist floated the suggestion that perhaps 
‘the time has come [in the federal system] to abolish appeal as a matter of right from the district courts 
to the courts of appeals, and allow such review only where it is granted in the discretion of a panel of 
the appellate court.’”). There are two other notable circumstances of guaranteed review. There is a 
special procedure for certain claims involving the Voting Rights Act, certain types of campaign finance 
claims, and redistricting claims. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973aa-2, 1973c (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (2012); 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 403, 116 Stat. 81, 113–14. For these 
claims, a party can obtain Supreme Court direct review of a three-judge district court’s decision. 
§§ 1973aa-2, 1973c; § 2284(a); § 403, 116 Stat. 81, 113–14. Approximately half of the election law 
cases on the Supreme Court docket have reached the Court through this procedure. Shapiro v. McManus, 
136 S. Ct. 450, 452 (2015); Joshua A. Douglas, The Procedure of Election Law in Federal Courts, 2011 
UTAH L. REV. 433, 458 (2011). 
  The other special procedure is for specific campaign finance claims and energy conservation 
claims. For these challenges, after a district court judge has issued an order or judgment, judges must 
give these claims direct certification to a court of appeals, sitting en banc. 2 U.S.C. § 437h (2006); 42 
U.S.C. § 8514(a)(2) (2006); Douglas, supra, at 469. Any party who wishes for Supreme Court review 
of the en banc order or judgment must petition for a writ of certiorari. 
 203. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348–49 (1976); Malcolm v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 995 
F.2d 346, 350 (2d Cir. 1993); ABA Comm. on Standards of Judicial Administration, Standards Relating 
to Appellate Courts § 3.10 cmt.18 (1994) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS]. The standards state that: 
The right of appeal, while never held to be within the due process guaranty of the United States 
Constitution, is a fundamental element of procedural fairness as generally understood in this 
country. That right should be accorded an aggrieved party to a trial court proceeding. To 
maintain the integrity of trial court proceedings and to prevent their interruption by piecemeal 
appellate review, appeal of right should be available only from final judgments. 
Id. See also ABA STANDARDS, supra note 203, § 3.10 (a party “should be entitled to one appeal of right 
from a final judgment”); Robertson, supra note 201, at 1245–50 (examining “how the right to appeal 
has become ensconced among the procedures required to ensure basic fairness”). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2940365 
2018] STAYS 905 
correct any errors made by district courts.204 Formally, the right of civil litigants 
to at least one appeal is statutory in nature.205 Although the Supreme Court has 
opined repeatedly that there is no constitutional right to appeal,206 appellate 
review of civil matters seems essential to fundamental due process. 
It is difficult to pin down the Court’s reasoning for holding that 
constitutional due process does not require the right to appeal.207 The Court has 
stated that there is no constitutional right to appeal as fact, with no reasoning to 
support the assertion.208 At other times, the Court has offered examples in which 
courts do not grant, or historically have not granted, a right of review to argue 
that the Due Process Clause does not require a right of review.209 
The Court’s repeated repudiations of a constitutional due process right to 
appellate review might be more a function of pragmatism than anything else. 
Nearly every jurisdiction statutorily grants a right to appeal in all civil and 
criminal litigation.210 There is little cause for the Supreme Court to hold that 
 
 204. See Ryan v. Gonzales, 568 U.S. 57, 75 (2013) (“ordinary error correction through appeal”); 
Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 111 (2009) (noting that certain types of review serve 
as “‘safety valve[s]’ for promptly correcting serious errors” (quoting Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop 
Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 883 (1994)); Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 
406 Mass. 701, 706 (1990) (noting the power of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts “to correct 
and prevent errors”); PAUL D. CARRINGTON, DANIEL J. MEADOR & MAURICE ROSENBERG, JUSTICE 
ON APPEAL 2–4 (1976); Paul D. Carrington, A Critical Assessment of the Cultural and Institutional 
Roles of Appellate Courts, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 231, 235 (2007) (“The indispensable task of the 
appellate court is to correct error, or perhaps more precisely, to convince the parties and their counsel 
that the possibility of incorrect application of the law has been seriously considered by judges of rank 
and security.”); Chris Guthrie, Misjudging, 7 NEV. L.J. 420, 444 (2007) (“Courts of appeals exist in large 
part to remedy judicial error.”); Chad M. Oldfather, Error Correction, 85 IND. L.J. 49 (2010) (examining 
the error correction role of courts of appeals). But see Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, 
Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 1047 n.257 (2005) (“[E]rror correction is not a sufficient basis” 
for the Supreme Court to take a case); Kermit Roosevelt III, Light from Dead Stars: The Procedural 
Adequate and Independent State Ground Reconsidered, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1888, 1916 (2003) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court does not ordinarily engage in error-correction.”). 
 205. See Dalton, supra note 201, at 62 n.4 (“It has long been clear that the right to appeal is 
statutory.”); Robertson, supra note 201, at 1222. 
 206. See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 131 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting the 
Court’s “oft-affirmed view that due process does not oblige States to provide for any appeal . . . .”); 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (plurality opinion) (“[A] State is not required by the Federal 
Constitution to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review at all.” (citation omitted)); 
Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940) (“[T]he right to a judgment from more than one 
court is a matter of grace and not a necessary ingredient of justice . . . .”); Reetz v. Mich., 188 U.S. 505, 
508 (1903) (“Neither is the right of appeal essential to due process of law.”); see also Dalton, supra note 
201, at 63; Robertson, supra note 201, at 1233–34. 
 207. See Dalton, supra note 201, at 69. When presented with the issue of whether there is a 
constitutional right to appeal, the Roberts Court most often denies those questions certiorari. Robertson, 
supra note 201, at 1235. 
 208. See, e.g., M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 131 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18; 
Cobbledick, 309 U.S. at 325. 
 209. See, e.g., Reetz, 188 U.S. at 508; see also McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894). 
 210. Dalton, supra note 201, at 62–63 n.2 (arguing that the right to appeal is “nearly universal” 
because, at most, two states do not technically grant the right to appeal in all matters); Robertson, supra 
note 201, at 1234. In Virginia—one of the two jurisdictions that does not statutorily grant a right to 
appeal in all cases—the state supreme court’s procedure for determining whether to grant review bears 
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there is a constitutional due process source for the right to appeal, especially in 
civil cases, because the only functional difference for the Court would be to give 
criminal defendants convicted in just one state, West Virginia, a right to appeal 
without first filing a petition for review.211 The question of a constitutional right 
to appeal comes before the Court so rarely that nearly all Court precedent on the 
subject is dicta.212 
Despite arguments to the contrary, constitutional due process may require 
the right to at least one appeal in civil matters. Both the fundamental fairness and 
the error-correction justifications for the right to appellate review are tied to 
constitutional due process. The Due Process Clause provides that neither the 
federal government nor any state shall deprive a person “of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law.”213 Guaranteeing parties at least one 
opportunity to obtain review in order to correct any errors by a lower court is an 
integral part of avoiding wrongful deprivation of due process. In one study of 
federal court cases, parties who lost at trial appealed in approximately 30 percent 
of cases.214 Courts of appeals reversed the trial court decisions in up to 33 percent 
of appealed cases.215 The percentage of appealed cases that appellate courts 
 
an exceptionally strong likeness to other states’ appellate review procedures. Dalton, supra note 201, at 
63 n.2. The other jurisdiction, West Virginia, falls short of statutorily granting a right to appeal solely 
because convicted criminal defendants have the right to petition for review but not the right to appeal. 
See Carrico v. Griffith, 272 S.E.2d 235, 239 (W. Va. 1980); State v. Legg, 151 S.E.2d 215, 218 (W. Va. 
1967); see also Dalton, supra note 201, at 63 n.2. 
 211. See infra note 222. 
 212. Robertson, supra note 201, at 1234. 
 213. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV. 
 214. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts: Civil 
Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 951–52 (2002) 
[hereinafter Clermont & Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts] (analysis of all cases 
terminated in federal courts 1988-1997); see also C. K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND 
JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 8 (1996) (parties appeal twenty percent of district court 
cases); Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Nontried Cases: Further 
Exploration of Anti-Plaintiff Appellate Outcomes, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 659, 685 (2004) 
[hereinafter Eisenberg, Appeal Rates] (noting that parties appeal approximately twenty percent of cases 
with definitive trial court judgments, and that parties appeal tried cases at approximately twice the rate 
of untried cases). 
 215. Clermont & Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts, supra note 214; see also 
Daniel C. Tucker, We Can’t Stay This Way: Changing the Standard for Staying Injunctions Pending 
Appeal After eBay, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1276, 1289 (2011). In some jurisdictions, appellate courts 
reverse the judgments in one-third to one-half of appealed, civil cases. See Note, Courting Reversal: The 
Supervisory Role of State Supreme Courts, 87 YALE L.J. 1191, 1198 n.30 (1978) (38.5% reversal rate); 
Robertson, supra note 201, at 1243 (48.0% reversal rate). But see Chris Guthrie, supra note 204, at 444 
n.160 (showing that appeals seldom lead to reversal); Chris Guthrie & Tracey E. George, The Futility 
of Appeal: Disciplinary Insights into the “Affirmance Effect” on the United States Courts of Appeals, 
32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 357, 358 & n.2, n.3 (2005) (noting that, although the Supreme Court reversed 
over 60 percent of the cases that it heard in the last decade, “[a]ffirmances are a defining feature of the 
courts of appeals: the courts of appeals affirmed 90% of the cases they decided during the same period”). 
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reverse is likely much higher when limited to civil matters.216 As others have 
argued, even if the ability to appeal was not previously essential to due 
process,217 current procedural limitations may mean that due process requires the 
ability to appeal. Some argue that the current decreased availability of many 
traditional procedural safeguards leaves parties even more dependent on 
appellate review to obtain fundamental due process.218 
2. The role of stays pending appeal in the opportunity for review 
The stays standard needs a guiding principle that will aid judges in making 
these important decisions in short timeframes. Even if the right to appeal is only 
statutory or is not required by constitutional due process, the federal court system 
effectively provides a right to appeal for all civil injunctive orders or judgments. 
Courts should use procedure to preserve that ability to appeal, wherever it exists, 
and to allow plaintiffs to enforce final orders or judgments where no appeal 
opportunity exists. Accordingly, decisions on stays pending appeal should tend 
to protect the opportunity to appeal, where guaranteed, and protect enforceability 
of final orders and judgments, where appeal is only discretionary. 
This guiding purpose will help courts balance competing principles in light 
of the practical realities of stay determinations. Stay decisions have significant 
consequences because the matters at issue are often extremely time-sensitive, 
and appeals can take years. Yet these decisions, which essentially decide 
substantive outcomes for parties and the public, fall into a forgotten, irregular, 
law-free zone. When the stakes are high and irreversible, it matters to litigants 
that courts get stay decisions right. Bringing stays standards and procedures in 
line with protecting appellate review, where likely, and protecting finality, where 
review is only discretionary, will increase institutional legitimacy, predictability, 
fairness, and accuracy. As discussed above, there is no better-suggested guiding 
principle.219 Courts should not employ an undertheorized procedural mechanism 
to choose between plaintiffs’ ability to enforce a final order and defendants’ 
ability to obtain meaningful opportunity to appeal. 
To prevent the availability of appeal from becoming a mere formality, some 
procedural safeguards are necessary. Along with the right to appeal (wherever 
present and whether statutory or constitutional in source) should come an 
 
 216. See Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 952 (1984) (discussing the “norms of 
affirmance” and low reversal rates in most criminal appeals); see generally Courting Reversal, supra 
note 215, at 1200–10. 
 217. But there is support for the argument that there has historically been constitutional due 
process protection of the ability to appeal civil cases at common law or, at least, beginning with the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. Robertson, supra note 201, at 1237. 
 218. See id. at 1256–57. Both the Court and scholars have noted that “what process is due” can 
change over time and can depend on context. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). The Court 
has previously used the Mathews test and turned to contemporary practice to determine “what process 
is due.” Id. at 333; Robertson, supra note 201, at 1240–43. 
 219. See supra Part IV. 
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auxiliary right generally not to have a judgment enforced before an appellate 
court considers the appeal. Absent such a protection, the right to appeal would 
essentially be meaningless in some cases. Because notions of fundamental 
fairness counsel in favor of guaranteed appellate review of district court civil 
judgments by courts of appeals, a presumption of stays of district court 
judgments or orders is necessary for guaranteed appellate review to be effective. 
Stay determinations have decision costs because they entail striking a 
compromise between enforcing a final judgment or order and preserving the 
opportunity for meaningful appeal. The principles of protecting finality and 
preserving the ability to obtain meaningful review serve as limitations on each 
other in stay determinations. The competition between finality and preserving 
meaningful appeal functions similarly to attempts to minimize error costs. Where 
review of a judgment or order is discretionary, there is no right to appeal to 
protect, which decreases the decision cost of denying a stay. Where irreparable 
harm pending review is unlikely, there is no threat to the appeal being 
meaningful, which decreases the decision cost of denying a stay. Conversely, 
where review for a judgment or order is guaranteed, there is a right to appeal to 
protect, which increases the decision cost of denying a stay. Where irreparable 
harm pending review is likely, there is a threat to the appeal being meaningful, 
which increases the decision cost of denying a stay. 
In the federal court system, as in many three-tiered court systems, there is 
typically no right of appeal to the highest court and appeal is guaranteed to the 
intermediate appellate court.220 The circuit courts and Supreme Court play 
different roles in the judicial system, as demonstrated by the difference between 
appeals as of right to circuit courts and the discretionary Supreme Court 
certiorari system. This difference suggests that fundamental fairness does not 
require a second level of review and counsels in favor of treating stays pending 
appeal differently between these courts. After all, unlike courts of appeals, the 
Supreme Court does not see itself as a court of error correction.221 When 
availability of appeal is discretionary and, thus, much more limited,222 there is 
far less need, or no need at all, for a presumption of a stay to effectuate a 
 
 220. Dalton, supra note 201, at 64. But see supra note 202 (noting that some cases go from a 
three-judge district court to nondiscretionary Supreme Court review). 
 221. See Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 204, at 1047 n.257 (noting that “error correction is 
not a sufficient basis” for the Supreme Court to take a case); Roosevelt III, supra note 204, at 1916 
(“[T]he Supreme Court does not ordinarily engage in error-correction.”). 
 222. The Supreme Court generally grants and hears oral argument in approximately 1 percent of 
the cases for which the Court receives petitions for writs of certiorari. See Frequently Asked Questions 
(FAQs), SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/faq_general.aspx [https://perma.cc/YX8T-D9Q4]; Jeffrey O. 
Cooper & Douglas A. Berman, Passive Virtues and Casual Vices in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 66 
BROOK. L. REV. 685, 718 (2001); Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme 
Court: Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1493, 1515 (2008); Robert 
H. Mnookin & Robert B. Wilson, Rational Bargaining and Market Efficiency: Understanding Pennzoil 
v. Texaco, 75 VA. L. REV. 295, 298 n.17 (1989). 
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meaningful right of appeal before a court has granted review. Therefore, courts 
should employ a presumption against stays pending writs of certiorari to the 
Supreme Court and pending discretionary review before other courts. The next 
Part proposes such a model. 
V. 
PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE STAYS PENDING APPEAL DECISIONS 
A. Aligning the Stays Standard 
To bring the substantive standard of stay determination in line with the 
purpose of stays—to protect a meaningful opportunity to appeal, where 
guaranteed, and to protect the enforceability of orders where appeal is 
discretionary—requires both major and minor changes to the stays standard. 
Courts should use different presumptions depending on whether the request for 
a stay is pending guaranteed or discretionary review. This Part also queries 
whether courts should stop considering the balance of the hardships and the 
public interest when making stay determinations. 
1. Different Standards for Stays Pending Appeal Depending on 
Availability of Review 
As discussed above, the opportunity to seek judicial review has been 
guaranteed historically due to fundamental fairness concerns and to give courts 
of appeals an opportunity to correct errors.223 This Article argues that, along with 
this meaningful opportunity to appeal should come an auxiliary right224 generally 
not to have the underlying judgment or order enforced such that a party who lost 
below, but who is likely to win on appeal, would be irreparably harmed before a 
court of appeals reviews the underlying order. A standard that does not protect 
the auxiliary right to a stay where there is a guaranteed opportunity to appeal 
would essentially render the opportunity to appeal meaningless. Moreover, to 
best navigate the tension between the value of finality and due process concerns, 
courts should harmonize the standard and procedures for deciding stay requests 
with this purpose. When determining a request for a stay pending review of a 
civil injunctive order, the court should first assess whether review is guaranteed. 
A. Stays Pending Guaranteed Opportunity for Appellate Review 
With guaranteed opportunity for review comes the possibility of a court of 
appeals reversing a district court’s order or judgment, and the presumption of a 
stay protects the auxiliary right to that appeal. The substantive standard for stays 
should reflect both the importance of enforcing court judgments and orders and 
 
 223. See supra Part IV.C. 
 224. Id. 
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guaranteed appeal, where it exists, which necessarily includes the possibility that 
a court may reverse or vacate the judgment or order. 
To prevent the right of appeal from being hollow, when review is 
guaranteed225 and a losing defendant226 requests a stay,227 courts should have a 
presumption in favor of granting stays for final judgments and orders. When a 
defendant applies for a stay pending guaranteed review of a final order or 
judgment, federal courts should grant such applications unless the plaintiff228 
demonstrates that there is little likelihood of success on appeal and that the 
plaintiff is likely to suffer irreparable harm if the court grants a stay.229 If a 
plaintiff demonstrates both of those considerations, then meaningful appellate 
review no longer warrants a stay. 
Furthermore, protecting the right to meaningful appeal does not require 
staying judgments or orders that have little chance of being overturned when a 
stay would cause the plaintiff irreparable harm. A court should deny a stay only 
if a winning plaintiff meets both of these thresholds. To prevent a stay, winning 
plaintiffs should demonstrate that defendants are not likely to succeed on appeal 
and that granting a stay pending appeal is likely to cause irreparable harm to 
plaintiffs. Because a court has already ruled against the defendants, it should not 
be difficult for plaintiffs to persuade the court that the defendants are unlikely to 
win on appeal. Plaintiffs should be able to enforce the judgment or order pending 
appeal only if they would otherwise suffer irreparable harm. 
Requiring only that plaintiffs demonstrate one of these considerations—
either that defendants are not likely to succeed on appeal or that granting a stay 
pending appeal is likely to cause irreparable harm—when the court has already 
 
 225. Review is guaranteed for appeals from federal district courts to courts of appeals and for 
certain other claims. See supra note 202. 
 226. This Article specifies defendants and plaintiffs because only losing defendants, not losing 
plaintiffs, can have orders or judgments that they can request a court to stay pending appeal. When 
plaintiffs lose, there is no order or judgment that they can request a court to stay while review is pending. 
Plaintiffs appeal precisely because the court did not issue an order or judgment in their favor. What 
plaintiffs seek in such instance is some type of preliminary injunction, which is different in nature from 
a stay substantively and procedurally. 
 227. This Article does not suggest that courts stay orders or judgments automatically. Courts 
should still only consider staying orders and judgments when requested to do so by a party. If no party 
requests a stay, a court should not consider holding the order or judgment in abeyance. Further, this 
model does not suggest any default rule to govern the relationship either between the parties or between 
the rule of law, finality, and the right to appellate review. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling 
Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 93 (1989). 
Instead, this model offers rebuttable presumptions that turn on the availability of review. 
 228. For discussion of plaintiff bearing this burden, see infra Part V.A.2. 
 229. This test is conjunctive, as discussed below. This Article refrains from suggesting how 
courts should consider the balance of the hardships or the public interest when making stay 
determinations because it questions whether courts should consider these two factors at all. See infra 
Part V.A.3. If, pending guaranteed review, a party requests that a Supreme Court Justice vacate, modify, 
or grant a stay that was previously granted or denied by a district court, a three-judge district court, or a 
court of appeals, the Supreme Court should employ the same standard as a district court or court of 
appeals should have employed, according to this model. 
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ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, is not a high enough standard. When the court 
already thinks that it is likely that defendants will lose on appeal, as will often 
be the case when the court rules in favor of the plaintiffs, a plaintiff also should 
have to show that they would likely suffer irreparable harm pending appeal in 
order for a court to deny a defendant’s application for a stay. Because a stay in 
these circumstances would protect defendants’ meaningful opportunity to 
appeal, a court should deny a defendant’s stay request only if a plaintiff is both 
likely to win again in the appellate court and likely to suffer irreparable harm if 
the order is stayed pending appeal. 
B. Stays Pending Discretionary Review 
In most federal cases, however, there is no guarantee of a right to more than 
one appeal of a final judgment or order.230 It is within the Court’s discretion to 
deny petitions for writs of certiorari, which it does in the vast majority of cases.231 
Thus, for nearly all petitions for writs of certiorari, this auxiliary right to the 
presumption of a stay is lacking. In such cases pending discretionary review, 
there is much less need, or no need at all, for a stay because there is no guaranteed 
appeal to protect, and review is extremely unlikely.232 Thus, there is no 
competing concern for appeal running counter to the value of finality. Moreover, 
preventing the enforcement of the judgment or order pending the writ could 
irreparably harm the party who won below even though the Court may decline 
to hear the case. 
The Supreme Court, or any other court with discretionary review, should 
have a rebuttable presumption against requests for stays if the reviewing court 
has not yet granted review. Generally, winning parties should be able to enforce 
final civil injunctive orders and judgments pending discretionary review for 
finality purposes. In such circumstances, a court has already made a reasoned 
judgment prior to an application for a stay pending appeal, and parties generally 
have already had the benefit of one guaranteed appeal.233 A stay of a judgment 
pending certiorari or review should remain an extraordinary remedy due to the 
discretionary nature of the review. Parties are generally entitled to the prompt 
execution of orders, and stays are an intrusion into that ordinary process.234 
Guaranteed appeals merit this intrusion, but discretionary review often does not 
because a stay is generally only required to protect guaranteed review. In certain 
circumstances, however, stays pending appeal may be a necessary tool for a court 
providing discretionary review to ensure the administration of justice. 
 
 230. See supra Part IV.C. 
 231. Id. 
 232. See supra note 222. 
 233. An exception regarding direct appeals to the Supreme Court from three-judge courts is 
discussed at supra note 202. 
 234. See supra Part II.A. 
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If review is discretionary, as it is for cases pending writs of certiorari from 
the Supreme Court, and the reviewing court has not yet granted review or 
certiorari, then a court should deny a stay request unless the petitioner235 
demonstrates that: (1) the court is likely to grant review,236 (2) there is a 
likelihood of success on appeal, and (3) the petitioner is likely to suffer 
irreparable harm pending review, absent a stay. This will allow for prompt 
enforcement of the lower court’s order or judgment unless denying a stay is 
likely to irreparably harm an applicant who is likely to succeed on appeal and 
where review is likely to occur. 
If an applicant for a stay demonstrates likelihood of a court granting review 
or certiorari or likelihood of success upon review, but does not demonstrate 
likelihood that the applicant will suffer irreparable harm pending disposition, 
then the Court should deny the motion for a stay. Even if the party applying for 
a stay is likely to win upon review, there is not sufficient reason to delay 
enforcement of a court order or judgment if the losing party will not suffer 
irreparable harm pending discretionary review. Similarly, if an applicant for a 
stay demonstrates the likelihood of irreparable harm pending disposition, but 
does not demonstrate likelihood of success and that the Court will grant review, 
the Court should deny the motion for a stay. Even if the moving party may suffer 
irreparable harm, there is insufficient reason to delay enforcement of a court 
order or judgment if the moving party is likely to lose on appeal. 
If the Supreme Court has granted a writ of certiorari (or after another court 
has granted review), the court should determine a request for a stay based on the 
standard outlined above for appeals with guaranteed review.237 In such 
circumstances, courts should have a presumption in favor of granting stays 
because, at that point, the case enters into the rare area of obtaining review from 
a court of discretion. For that now-guaranteed review to be meaningful, 
considerations should run in much the same way as when a losing defendant 
requests a stay from a district court order pending guaranteed appeal to a court 
of appeals.238 
2. Rethinking the Burden for the Four-Prong Standard for Stays Pending 
Appeal 
For a stay request pending guaranteed review, courts should have a 
rebuttable presumption in favor of granting a stay unless the plaintiff 
 
 235. For discussion of the losing defendant bearing this burden, see supra Part V.A.2. 
 236. Only the court with discretionary review, most often the Supreme Court, should assess this 
factor: whether the court is likely to grant review or certiorari. Lower courts determining requests for a 
stay pending discretionary review should determine whether to grant a stay based on only the other two 
factors. A standard should not require lower federal courts to predict likelihood of the Supreme Court 
granting certiorari nor should the opportunity for meaningful review turn on a lower federal court’s 
prediction of whether another court will choose to assert jurisdiction. 
 237. See supra Part V.1.a. 
 238. Id. 
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demonstrates that the losing defendant is unlikely to succeed on appeal and that 
the plaintiff is likely to suffer irreparable harm.239 In a change from current 
procedure,240 the stay movant should not bear the burden in these circumstances 
because the presumption of a stay, when requested, should protect the movant’s 
right to a meaningful appeal.241 Currently, in practice, each party tries to show 
that its side is likely to suffer irreparable harm pending review, that the other side 
is not, and that, even if the other side would, its own irreparable harm is 
comparatively worse. This proposal cuts back on the number of factors that both 
parties must show and that judges are supposed to consider. 
For a stay request pending discretionary review, courts should have a 
rebuttable presumption against granting a stay unless the movant, or defendant, 
demonstrates that the court is likely to grant review,242 that there is a likelihood 
of success on appeal, and that the petitioner is likely to suffer irreparable harm 
pending review, absent a stay. Keeping with current procedure,243 the stay 
movant should bear the burden in these circumstances because it should be 
harder for the movant to obtain a stay when appeal is not even guaranteed.244 
3. Questioning Consideration of the Public Interest and the Balance of 
the Hardships 
Decisions on stays pending appeal occur after a court has already entered a 
reasoned judgment, but these decisions often take place with relatively little 
additional information and often in a very short timeframe. The safeguard of a 
court already having issued a non-preliminary underlying order without time 
limitations, along with the practical constraints of limited guidance and time, 
may warrant or even require a simplified standard for stays pending appeal. 
When determining requests for stays pending appeal, perhaps courts should 
consider only the factors that are essential to stay decisions — the likelihood of 
success and irreparable harm.245 It may seem intuitive to consider the public 
interest and the balance of the hardships in stay determinations, but considering 
these factors may undo precedent or careful compromises in procedure or 
substance. Although it merits more discussion than space allows here, perhaps 
courts should question whether to continue to consider these factors when 
determining stays.246 
 
 239. For either of these two requirements, courts should also accept demonstrations of the 
inverse—that the plaintiff is likely to win on appeal or that the losing defendant is unlikely to suffer 
irreparable harm pending appeal. 
 240. See supra note 106. 
 241. See supra Part IV.C. 
 242. See supra note 239. 
 243. See supra note 106. 
 244. See supra Part V.A.1.b. 
 245. See supra text accompanying notes 107–111. 
 246. For a full treatment of this possibility, see Portia Pedro, Shadow Procedure: When Equity 
Undermines Law (Nov. 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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Considering the balance of the hardships and the public interest may help 
courts temporarily account for third-party interests and navigate potential harms 
to the state, parties, and the public in preliminary decisions until courts can give 
the matter full consideration. But considering those factors after courts have 
already issued final decisions might unnecessarily waste time, increase the 
influences of arbitrary makeweights and cognitive biases, and increase risks of 
irreparable harm to litigants likely to succeed on appeal. 
Deciding stays pending appeal under the current standard that includes the 
public interest and balancing the hardships is necessarily more complicated and 
difficult to assess than deciding the underlying order. Determining whether to 
grant a request for a stay pending appeal requires some assessment of the 
underlying judgment, but it also occurs in a more rushed timeframe and requires 
gauging the likelihood of success on appeal and irreparable harm pending appeal. 
Perhaps the inquiry should simply stop there.247 A standard that includes more 
complicated factors or factors that are more susceptible to becoming arbitrary 
makeweight will result in poorer decision-making and more arbitrary, 
unpredictable decisions. 
Some may hope to retain consideration of the public interest and balancing 
the hardships in stay determinations because it gives judges and justices more 
flexibility and discretion, but more discretion is not always better. Factors should 
be included in a standard because they are functional.248 Equitable discretion 
permits judges to make decisions “appropriate to the justice of the particular 
case,”249 but it can also be “mere personal whim”250 and a “cloak for arbitrary 
judicial policymaking.”251 The equitable discretion in the public interest and 
balancing the hardship factors allows for “a rectification of law where it fails 
through generality,”252 but it is not clear that law has failed when a court is 
determining whether to grant a stay pending appeal. Equity tends to be the 
discretion of the decision-maker that is inherent and complete, such that the 
power includes disregarding or overriding applicable law or precedent.253 In 
 
 247. There are some similarly simplified standards for preliminary injunctions, which historically 
use the same four-prong tests as some courts rely on in stay determinations, for statutory or constitutional 
claims. Id. (some courts do not require a showing or irreparable harm or do not consider the balancing 
of the hardships). 
 248. See Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 VAND. L. REV. 997, 1011–
12 (2015). 
 249. Id. at 1041. 
 250. Id. (citing John Selden, Equity, in TABLE-TALK: BEING THE DISCOURSES OF JOHN SELDEN, 
ESQ. 43, 43–44 (1689)); Daniel A. Farber, Equitable Discretion, Legal Duties, and Environmental 
Injunctions, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 513, 526–27 (1984); John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor’s 
Foot? The Inherent Remedial Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1121, 1162–65 
(1996)). 
 251. Bray, supra note 248, at 1041. 
 252. Doug Rendleman, The Triumph of Equity Revisited: The Stages of Equitable Discretion, 15 
NEV. L.J. 1397, 1399 (2015) (quoting ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 172 (J.E.C. Welldon trans., 
Macmillan 1912) (c. 384 B.C.E.)). 
 253. Lannetti, supra note 190, at 288. 
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order to avoid disregarding or overriding applicable law and precedent, perhaps 
the only stay determinations in which courts should consider the public interest 
or balance the hardships are when these factors are included in the underlying 
law, statute, or likelihood of success analyses. Because stays pending appeal 
determine whether to hold final judgments and orders in abeyance, unfettered 
discretion in stays might allow personal whims or arbitrary judicial policy-
making to subvert the law.254 
Eliminating consideration of these two factors would save time in decision-
making and eliminate the risk of adding arbitrary makeweights to stay 
determinations. Especially given the rushed nature of stay determinations, it is 
worrisome that courts may rely on arbitrary and amorphous values to nullify the 
right to appeal or prevent the enforcement of a reasoned court order. 
B. Courts Should Write 
As discussed above, more often than not, courts do not give reasons for 
stays pending appeal determinations.255 Yet the justifications for courts writing 
opinions for stay determinations are almost too numerous and apparent to 
mention.256 Stay decisions deserve explanations because, if left unexplained, 
these procedural decisions can change litigants’ lives and public law.257 For stays 
pending appeal to fulfill their purpose and allow courts to comport with 
institutional design, this Section lays out suggestions for when courts should and 
should not give reasons for stay pending appeal decisions. 
Although courts’ resources are limited, courts are also expected to give 
reasons258 for decisions.259 This expectation arises, in part, because giving 
reasons helps the resource-constrained court system maximize “‘correct’ 
answers.”260 Courts regularly give reasons for decisions.261 Because giving 
reasons uses resources, including time, courts must navigate a tension in deciding 
when to give reasons and when to refrain. 
 
 254. See Susan H. Black, A New Look at Preliminary Injunctions: Can Principles from the Past 
Offer Any Guidelines to Decisionmakers in the Future?, 36 ALA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1984) (common law 
judges “charged the Chancellor with attempting to subvert the whole law of England by substituting 
conscience for definite rule”). 
 255. See supra Part III.B. 
 256. See notes 257–265. 
 257. See supra Part I. 
 258. This Article uses the term “reasons” as any item offered as an explanation for a decision, 
even if it is a poor justification for that decision. See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. 
REV. 633, 635–36 (1995). 
 259. See id. at 633 n.2 (noting that issuing a decision without giving reasons for the decision is 
often a decisional deficiency). 
 260. See Lewis Kornhauser, Adjudication by a Resource-Constrained Team: Hierarchy and 
Precedent in a Judicial System, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1605, 1606 (1995) (proposing a model of the 
judiciary as a “judicial team,” which aims to maximize “‘correct’ answers” regardless of what definition 
of “correct” it chooses to adopt). 
 261. See Robin J. Effron, Reason Giving and Rule Making in Procedural Law, 65 ALA. L. REV. 
683, 715, 723–24 (2014) (acknowledging an “existing norm of justificatory opinion writing”). 
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Additionally, institutional design is relevant for determining when courts 
should provide reasons. A primary purpose of appeals is “to correct errors; to 
develop legal principles; and to tie geographically dispersed lower courts into a 
unified, authoritative legal system,”262 so reason giving is commonly associated 
with, and expected of, appellate opinions.263 In the tiered US system, federal 
courts of appeals and the Supreme Court have a “harmonizing and law-giving 
function.”264 Giving reasons can remedy areas where judges may have, in effect, 
unreviewable discretion and may help to fill in some of the “interstices of 
procedural doctrines.”265 
Deciding whether and when courts should give reasons for procedural 
decisions entails balancing regulating procedure with rules and giving courts 
flexibility through discretion.266 Strict rules simplify coordination among courts 
and promote consistency and predictability.267 Flexibility and discretion in 
procedural rules allow judges to play a managerial role in guiding cases.268 In 
procedural areas for which there is often no meaningful review, the purpose of 
appeals is lacking and “difficulties emerge in the way that procedural rules are 
promulgated, interpreted, and applied.”269 For decisions on procedural 
mechanisms that courts would implement best with a mix of a strict rule and 
discretion and that may otherwise be insulated from meaningful review, 
Professor Robin J. Effron argued that courts should have discretion, have clear 
lists of factors to consider, and provide reasoning.270 
This Section discusses these concerns for district courts, courts of appeals, 
and the Supreme Court and recommends when each judicial level should offer 
reasoning for stay determinations. 
1. District Courts 
District courts are uniquely situated in that the only stay determinations that 
these courts make are almost always of their own underlying orders.271 These 
courts typically have the most information regarding the circumstances of the 
cases for which they may be asked for stays. Additionally, because district court 
judges generally issue stay orders individually and, thus, do not need to strategize 
to gain other judges’ votes, they have fewer strategic reasons to avoid writing 
opinions for stays pending appeal than might courts of appeals or the Supreme 
 
 262. See id. at 704–05 (quoting Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of 
Modern Civil Process, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 631, 662 (1994)); supra note 215. 
 263. Schauer, supra note 258, at 638. 
 264. See Effron, supra note 261, at 705–06. 
 265. Id. at 704–05. 
 266. See id. at 688. 
 267. See id. at 690–95. 
 268. See id. at 695–98. 
 269. Id. at 705. 
 270. Id. at 715–16. 
 271. See supra Part II.A. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2940365 
2018] STAYS 917 
Court. Writing opinions could improve the quality of decision making for 
underlying stay determinations and could encourage judges to apply the 
appropriate standard.272 Thus, writing opinions for stays may decrease the risk 
of denying a meaningful opportunity to guaranteed appeal or of subjecting a 
party that is likely to win on appeal to suffer irreparable harm in the meanwhile. 
Giving reasons for stay determinations also helps to ensure fundamental fairness 
to parties.273 Opinions allow parties to know the bases for a decision that could 
irreparably affect their rights or their ability to meaningfully appeal. 
The primary cost to district courts for reason giving for stays of their own 
orders is that reason giving will use limited time that a court otherwise could 
spend on other tasks and that writing could delay a court’s stay decisions on time-
sensitive matters. But every task draws time and resources from other tasks. If a 
court is already deciding according to the standard, the additional time it takes 
to explain verbally that thought process should be reasonably short and, at least, 
should not be the dispositive factor for a court determining whether to write. 
Federal rules require courts to write a reasoned opinion every time that courts 
issue a preliminary injunction.274 In comparison, it does not seem overly 
burdensome to suggest that courts should write reasoned opinions more 
frequently for stay determinations. A stay decision runs the risk of preventing 
plaintiffs who have won, and who may win again on appeal, from enforcing their 
permanent injunctive orders, with the result that they will suffer irreparable harm 
of denying defendants a meaningful opportunity to appeal even where 
defendants have appeal as of right and are likely to win on appeal. There is no 
length requirement; judges can give reasons from the bench or write short 
opinions. Courts can grant or deny a temporary stay275 according to the 
presumption based on availability of review276 before giving reasons with the 
stay determination in the second stage. Courts could also issue stay orders first 
and write the opinion for the decision later. Parties and the judicial system will 
still benefit even if courts write opinions sometime after issuing the stay order. 
There will still likely be an increase in reasoned consideration if a judge knows 
that they will need to give reasons in the future.277 
A court writing a stay opinion about its own underlying order could worry 
that indicating that the defendant may be likely to succeed would undermine their 
underlying order and highlight potential weaknesses of the merits of their 
decision for reviewing courts. However, under the current standard, whether a 
court grants a stay or not in effect already reveals something about likelihood of 
success even if the court does not write about that factor. Additionally, courts 
 
 272. See supra notes 255–268. 
 273. Id. 
 274. See supra note 132; see also supra note 130 (same for temporary restraining orders). 
 275. See supra note 97. 
 276. See supra Part V.A.1. 
 277. See supra notes 255–267. 
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can give reasons for stay determinations while avoiding this risk. Courts can 
write stay opinions without ever writing about the likelihood of success factor, 
or they can write about this factor while only discussing the minimum threshold 
needed to demonstrate likelihood of success, which should be lower for a court 
determining a request to stay its own underlying order. 
Courts should find that a party has demonstrated likelihood of success 
wherever a party demonstrates that the chance of such success is probable, 
strong, substantial, or greater than 50 percent. Because the goal of stays pending 
appeal is to protect meaningful appellate review wherever it is guaranteed,278 and 
because courts are probably inclined to underestimate a losing party’s likelihood 
of success, the required showing for likelihood of success on appeal should not 
be especially high. Yet requiring only that the chance of success is “better than 
negligible” would include all but the most frivolous of appeals even where there 
is extremely little likelihood of success on appeal.279 That seems too low of a 
threshold. A threshold so low that likelihood of success need only be “not wholly 
without doubt,” “more than a mere possibility,” or “better than negligible” would 
render the requirement meaningless as nearly every stay movant would meet 
such a low threshold.280 
Some may worry that this threshold is too high, because a party requests a 
stay after already losing and, often, the court weighing the losing party’s success 
may be the same court that ruled against the losing party in the underlying order 
or judgment. Thus, there may be some sort of lock-in effect where courts 
underestimate likelihood of success.281 Presumably, if a court believed that the 
losing party would have a probable, strong, substantial, or greater than 50 percent 
chance of success on appeal, the court probably would not have ruled against 
that party. Thus, it is fitting that courts have a lower likelihood of success 
requirement for stays of their own orders or judgments. Thus, although the terms 
may have slightly different meanings, likelihood of success that is “reasonable,” 
a “serious legal question,” and a question serious enough to constitute “a fair 
ground for litigation” seem to avoid frivolity, but also counter the potential of 
lock-in effect or the almost negligible likelihood that a court would hold that a 
party it declared as losing had a greater than 50 percent chance of succeeding on 
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appeal. If the court that issued the underlying order or judgment, or any circuit 
court, denies a stay, however, the losing party can almost immediately request a 
stay from a panel, a court sitting en banc, or a higher court, none of which have 
the same predisposition against the losing party.282 
A district court giving reasons in stay determinations aids review and can 
lead to a more uniform stays standard as courts of appeals and the Supreme Court 
better identify and understand inconsistencies when courts explain decisions.283 
Courts writing opinions for stay determinations will also better facilitate appeals 
of stay applications to, and reviews of stay applications by, higher courts. 
Finally, writing more opinions would allow federal courts to build stays doctrine 
to ensure that stays are not unreasoned or poorly reasoned procedural decisions 
that preempt underlying orders. 
The current shortage of written stays precedent prevents courts from 
finding useful guidance. It is difficult to treat similar circumstances in similar 
ways absent any reasoned opinions for stays determinations. When there are 
extremely few written opinions, courts cannot build on the precedent of earlier 
decisions. District courts giving reasons for stay determinations will give future 
district courts more doctrine, even if not precedent, from which to draw. This 
could shorten the time future courts need to decide stays and improve the quality 
of those decisions.284 This also better allows parties and federal courts to engage 
in conversations about the stays standard. 
In summary, due to the low costs of giving reasons compared to its benefits, 
district courts should almost always give reasons for stay determinations. If 
doing so would take too long given a court’s or case’s constraints, a court can 
give reasons from the bench, do a two-part stay determination, or issue its 
decision first and then write the opinion later as time is available. If even that is 
still too difficult for district courts, courts should at least give reasons whenever 
they depart from the presumption285 based on availability of review. At a 
minimum, district courts should explain their decisions when they deny a stay 
for a guaranteed appeal and when they grant a stay for a discretionary appeal. 
2. Courts of Appeals 
As the middle level in the federal court system, courts of appeals play dual 
roles in stay determinations. Panels or a court sitting en banc may issue 
underlying orders, for which litigants can request stays from the court of appeals, 
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and for which litigants can request vacatur, modification, or grant of stays from 
the Supreme Court.286 Litigants may also call upon panels or a court sitting en 
banc to serve in an appellate role as arbiters of requests for vacatur, modification, 
or grant of stays from district courts.287 
When a court of appeals, by panel or en banc, gives reasons for a stay 
determination for which it also issued the underlying order or judgment, the 
benefits for the decision, court, and litigants are largely the same as they are for 
district courts.288 While the court of appeals shares district courts’ disincentives 
for giving reasons, the court of appeals has some additional deterrents. 
In comparison to district court judges,289 courts of appeals judges may have 
strategic reasons to avoid writing stays opinions because they decide by panel or 
en banc.290 When multiple judges decide a request for a stay, they may not 
coalesce around any one explanation for the decision. Not giving reasons, orally 
or in writing, may be a way to maintain a majority or plurality of judges. But the 
same could be true for every other decision that panels or courts sitting en banc 
make, such as the underlying and substantive decisions for which they routinely 
write reasoned opinions. Similar to other types of opinions, at times judges 
should agree with, or dissent from, the reasoning behind stay determinations. 
For future stay determinations, many of the incentives and disincentives for 
courts of appeals writing stay determinations are the same as for the district 
court.291 Yet, for courts of appeals, many of the costs of giving reasons for stay 
determinations are slightly lower while the benefits are greater in relation to the 
district courts. Because courts of appeals typically make stay determinations by 
panel,292 and only for the cases on appeal293 for which a losing litigant requests 
a stay,294 there is a smaller universe of court of appeals stay determinations. 
Additionally, each courts of appeals judge would likely only be responsible for 
writing approximately one of every three stay decisions, as the panel would share 
those duties. Because courts of appeals decisions are binding, appeals courts’ 
reasoned stay opinions give needed precedent to district courts in the circuit and 
to other circuit judges. Court of appeals’ written opinions can highlight 
inconsistencies and unresolved questions for the Supreme Court,295 which could 
help the Court clarify stays standards. 
One additional disincentive for a court of appeals judge to give reasons for 
a stay determination is if, in doing so, the court could preview how it will decide 
 
 286. See supra Part II.A. 
 287. See supra note 74. 
 288. See infra Part V.B.1. 
 289. See supra note 73. 
 290. See supra notes 76–77. 
 291. See supra Part V.B.1. 
 292. See supra Part II.A. 
 293. Id. 
 294. See supra note 226. 
 295. See supra notes 152, 161–166. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2940365 
2018] STAYS 921 
the appeal of the underlying order in a way that could impact decisions in other 
district courts. Some recent opinions, however, show that not writing opinions 
for stays can lead to even more confusion in lower federal courts. 
For instance, in Frank v. Walker,296 Seventh Circuit judges held 
confusingly dissimilar views of the Supreme Court’s reasoning for one stay 
determination, arguably, because the Supreme Court had not written an opinion 
giving reasons for its decision. The Seventh Circuit per curiam opinion noted 
that the Supreme Court had granted the stay because the Court had adopted the 
view that the public interest is best served by enforcing democratically enacted 
laws until the Court has finally determined the validity of the law.297 Dissenting 
Seventh Circuit judges noted that “of course there is no presumption against 
enjoining unconstitutional state laws pending appeals,”298 and presented a 
competing rationale for the stay—that the Court wanted to avoid uncertainty.299 
The Seventh Circuit per curiam and dissenting opinions were able to have 
diametrically opposed views of the Supreme Court’s rationale for granting the 
stay because no Supreme Court justice issued a written opinion justifying the 
stay determination.300 Both per curiam and dissenting opinions cited a Supreme 
Court summary order with no reasoning. That confusion about presumptions and 
reasoning for stay determinations became further compounded when the 
Supreme Court issued no written opinion justifying its decision when the Court 
eventually heard largely the same arguments regarding a stay in Frank v. 
Walker301 as the Seventh Circuit had heard below. That left lower federal courts 
with no explanation of why the Court had granted the earlier stay or of why the 
Court vacated the Seventh Circuit’s stay of the injunction in Frank v. Walker. 
Furthermore, not writing stay opinions has resulted in lower federal courts trying 
to read between the lines of nonexistent stay opinions. 
Courts of appeals should write opinions for stay determinations to clarify 
the stays standard, to highlight a question of stays doctrine for the Supreme 
Court, and to justify departures from the presumption based on availability of 
review.302 As time requires, courts of appeals can delay giving reasons for stay 
determinations, similarly to district courts.303 
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3. Supreme Court 
At the other end of the institutional hierarchy from the district court, the 
Supreme Court almost never determines stays of its own underlying final orders 
or judgments because, as the highest court in the land, its judgments are not 
appealable. Although the Court itself might benefit less than other federal courts 
might from writing stay opinions, its reasoning might benefit the parties and 
lower courts even more than would reasons for stay determinations from lower 
courts.304 Justices, more than other federal court judges, might feel pressure to 
avoid writing opinions on stay determinations for the purpose of garnering or 
maintaining support for the order. The Court disfavors renewals of stay 
applications so much so that circuit justice stay decisions are very rarely 
reconsidered.305 Additionally, because there is so much discussion among the 
justices about a stay determination before them306 and because the full Court 
rarely reconsiders its own stay determination, there is almost no reconsideration 
benefit to the justices to explaining their stay determinations in the first place. 
Yet lower federal courts could benefit significantly from the Court giving written 
explanations resolving potential inconsistencies in, and confusion with, the stays 
standard. 
On the other hand, there is almost no benefit from the Court issuing 
reasoning for likelihood to grant writs of certiorari or likelihood of success. To 
the contrary, the Court could unintentionally influence future lower courts’ 
substantive decisions by writing opinions that analyze the likelihood of success 
and the likelihood of granting certiorari, which is one of the primary 
disincentives for the Court giving reasons for stay determinations. If the Court 
writes stay opinions, lower federal courts might interpret those opinions as 
smoke signals on upcoming merits decisions. However, whether the Court grants 
a stay or not in effect tips its hand as to the likelihood of granting certiorari and 
ultimately success. Additionally, justices can give reasons for stay 
determinations while avoiding this risk. Moreover, the Court’s current custom307 
of not writing stay opinions does not seem to decrease the risk that the Court 
unintentionally influences lower court decisions. When the justices do not give 
reasons for their decisions, lower courts may attempt to read the unwritten tea 
leaves.308 
When the Court majority or plurality refrains from giving reasons for stay 
determinations, dissenters still can discuss reasoning and, perhaps, cast the 
majority’s reasoning as a straw man argument or misconstrue it in order to 
advance their own reasoning. This could result in confusion for lower courts 
searching for precedent if they only have dissenting or concurring opinions to 
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try to discern the majority or plurality reasoning. Thus, the general Court practice 
of not writing opinions for stay determinations may lead to dissents and 
concurrences with even less accurate descriptions of the majority and plurality 
decisions because their authors write such opinions knowing that it is highly 
unlikely that any other justice will later clarify the mischaracterization. 
Although the Supreme Court has the greatest justification for not writing 
stay opinions, failure to do so forces lower courts to read between the nonexistent 
lines of the Court’s stay decisions in search of guidance. By issuing more stay 
opinions, the Court can help fill out the interstices of stay doctrine to ensure that 
stays are fulfilling their purpose and to provide lower courts with relevant 
reasoned precedent. 
At times, circuit justices or the Court majority or plurality may have to 
refrain from writing in order to maintain a majority or plurality, or for the sake 
of expediency. Justices should nevertheless write opinions for stay 
determinations when needed to clarify the stays standard or if there is a written 
dissent. Lower federal courts should not have to resort to reading unwritten tea 
leaves. The opinion need not assess every stays factor in writing and, most likely, 
should avoid discussing the likelihood of the Court granting certiorari and the 
likelihood of success on appeal. 
C. Decision-Making Power and Procedures for Stays Pending Appeal 
Changing the substantive standard and writing expectations for stays 
pending appeal will best promote fairness, predictability, and the purpose of 
stays. Below are recommendations for stays procedure and allocations of 
decision-making power on a number of topics that range from who should 
consider a party’s initial stay application to if and how a court should be able to 
overturn prior stay determinations. Although some of the proposals may increase 
judicial workload, courts could also simplify stay determinations by eliminating 
two factors from the standard.309 
1. Initial Stay Application 
The requirement that parties generally must apply first to the district 
court—or to the court that issued the underlying order—for stays of judgments 
or orders pending appeal seems fitting, especially given the time constraints of 
stay determinations. Even though the issuing judge probably is more likely than 
another judge to deny a motion for a stay that would prevent the enforcement of 
his or her own order,310 the issuing judge’s familiarity with the case and the order 
or judgment probably still leave that judge in the best position to quickly assess 
a motion for a stay. 
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Procedural safeguards can mitigate the risk of issuing courts systematically 
denying stays in a way that works counter to the purpose of stays pending appeal. 
As discussed above, the court that issued the underlying order usually should not 
blindly deny the request for a stay without also issuing an opinion explaining its 
stay determination according to the substantive standard.311 When judges give 
reasoning for their decisions, especially in writing, the decisions tend to be more 
considered and less arbitrary.312 
Additionally, the stay determination of the issuing court is not the final 
decision on a stay pending appeal. A court of appeals panel, a circuit sitting en 
banc, or the Supreme Court (whichever court is not “locked in”313 by already 
having issued the underlying opinion) can suspend, modify, grant, or restore an 
injunction on terms that secure the losing party’s right to a meaningful appeal.314 
A party could also make a motion before a court that is not “locked in” to any 
decision yet if moving first in the issuing court would be impracticable or if the 
lower court already denied a motion for a stay.315 If a party demonstrates that 
impracticability, then there need not be any delay before a party can move a court 
of appeals for a stay.316 And, if a party cannot demonstrate that moving for a stay 
in the issuing court would be impracticable, such that the party must wait to make 
the motion in another court until after the first court denies the motion, the ability 
to request a stay from another court still somewhat mitigates the risk of the 
potentially “locked-in” court incorrectly determining the motion for a stay. 
2. Number of Judges 
Keeping with current procedure,317 if a district court judge individually 
issued the underlying order or judgment, that same individual judge should 
review the initial motion for a stay. As briefly described above, the issuing court 
is uniquely situated to assess quickly a motion for a stay due to the court’s 
familiarity with the case and the judgment or order. Review by panels of district 
court judges of every initial motion for a stay would dilute the efficiency benefits 
of the issuing judge’s familiarity with the matter. There would be little additional 
benefit of group deliberation. 
Similarly, courts of appeals judges and Supreme Court justices should also 
continue318 to individually determine motions for stays in most circumstances. 
The benefits of improved decision quality and accountability due to group 
decision-making do not justify the extra time that would be required for a panel 
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of judges or for the entire Court to become familiar enough with each case to 
decide a request for a stay and then to discuss and decide. When a single judge 
issues, or could have issued, the underlying order or judgment, it would seem 
odd and a waste of limited resources to require multiple judges or Justices to 
make stay determinations in concert. To guard against arbitrariness and 
idiosyncrasies, a losing party should continue to319 be able to request 
reconsideration from a court en banc, but a court can also deny the request for 
reconsideration.320 Generally, a party should not be able to request 
reconsideration from an individual judge or Justice, as reconsideration by one 
individual is akin to the same type of forum shopping that would be problematic 
if parties could pick the initial judge or justice reviewing their stay 
applications.321 
Finally, as justices have done on many occasions, a justice can refer any 
stay request to the full court.322 A court of appeals judge or panel should be able 
to do the same, referring the stay request to a panel or to the court en banc, as 
seems fit. 
3. Assigned Judge or Randomly Assigned 
As discussed above, under the current process, for stay requests beyond 
those to the issuing court, assignment of stay requests to appellate panels is 
random,323 but stay applications to the Supreme Court go to the appropriate 
circuit justice.324 After the circuit justice has decided the petition, the applicant 
can, next, request any justice of their own choosing.325 This process seems 
unfairly arbitrary. Unless and until the Court clarifies some more uniform stays 
doctrine, it seems problematic that every stay request from a given circuit is 
always determined by the same justice who might have a specific leaning 
substantively or a unique perspective on when the Court should and should not 
grant stays. Additionally, always having the circuit justice consider an initial 
request for a stay does seem to require that the applicant should be able to pick 
a justice of their own choosing for a renewed application for a stay. Nevertheless, 
because justices are highly averse to overturning another justice’s stay 
determination,326 the ability to select the justice for a renewal application is not 
really a safeguard against the circuit justice practice. This aversion, in effect, 
creates a dynamic whereby circuit justices enjoy almost complete and 
unquestioned control over whether stays are granted in their circuits or not.327 
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Although this current assignment of circuit justices is unlikely to affect stays of 
extremely time-sensitive, highly controversial issues—such as voting rights 
cases shortly before election day328—there are no such protections from the 
whims of a circuit justice for litigants in seemingly run-of-the-mill cases.329 
The Supreme Court should randomly assign all initial requests for stays to 
individual justices. Circuit justices, though, may be more familiar with some of 
the cases within the circuit in a way that could save time on some stay 
determinations more than if applications for stays were assigned to justices 
randomly. Yet, while familiarity and efficiency are important considerations, 
they are insufficient to justify the current procedure given that a circuit justice is 
not likely to deviate from the determination of the initial justice, rendering the 
process ineffective, particularly in cases that warrant such deviation. Assigning 
stay requests to justices randomly instead of by circuit may promote fairness in 
stay determinations even though it could cause a slight increase in time for the 
randomly assigned justice to gain familiarity with the case that the respective 
circuit justice may already have. This raises the question whether there may be 
other instances where the employment of circuit justices could be irrelevant and, 
perhaps, unfairly arbitrary. 
4. Overturning Prior Stay Determinations within the Same Court 
Existing mechanisms330 for lower federal courts and for the Supreme Court 
to enable a court, en banc, to reconsider a stay request previously decided by a 
member or panel of the court should remain in place. Even though courts will 
likely only very rarely assert this reconsideration power,331 this procedure can 
provide a stopgap to ensure that a full court can debate any highly controversial 
issue even if an individual judge or justice does not refer it to the full court. This 
also allows for new consideration by a larger group when circumstances 
important to the stay request change. In the very rare case of reconsideration,332 
the full court should consider the request de novo instead of giving a high level 
of deference to the earlier determination by a member of the court. Although a 
court will probably be highly unlikely, essentially, to overturn the earlier 
determination,333 this at least allows for that chance, albeit in rare circumstances. 
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5. Level of Deference to Lower Court Stay Determinations 
The ability to request that a court of appeals or the US Supreme Court 
vacate a stay pending appeal granted by a lower court or grant a stay that the 
lower court denied is an important safeguard for ensuring that guaranteed 
appellate review is meaningful. That courts also promptly enforce judgments and 
orders where preserving the right to appeal does not counsel otherwise. 
Currently, a number of jurisdictions give lower courts’ stay determinations great 
deference.334 There are efficiency savings if a higher court defers to a lower 
court’s stay determination where the lower court issued a reasoned opinion 
following a clear standard where there is not clear error. Under the current 
circumstances of the nearly law-free zone of stays,335 however, the potential cost 
to the purpose of stays pending appeal is too high for appellate courts and the 
Supreme Court to defer to lower court stay determinations. 
Even where a lower court issued a reasoned opinion and followed the 
correct standard, appellate courts should consider requests to grant, vacate, or 
modify stays pending appeal de novo. Although the appellate court will expend 
time familiarizing itself with the case, the time is well spent as the appellate court 
is better positioned than the lower court to assess a party’s likelihood of success 
on appeal. This is truer for requests for a stay pending a writ of certiorari. It 
makes little sense for a justice to defer to a court of appeals’s guess as to the 
likelihood of success before the Supreme Court when the justice is much more 
likely to be able to ascertain whether certiorari is likely and whether success is 
likely, since the justice is on the Court and is one of the nine or fewer people 
who will be deciding. 
Appellate courts should be actively involved in guiding lower courts in 
determining what constitutes irreparable harm and likelihood of success on 
appeal. As noted above, an appellate court granting (or vacating) a stay where 
the lower court may have done the opposite is a procedural failsafe to protect 
parties from lower court judges who may be predisposed to enforce their 
opinions at the cost of a party’s right to meaningful appeal. Because the ability 
to have a meaningful appeal even where appeal is guaranteed is at risk, along 
with irreparable harm pending appeal, appellate courts should not defer to lower 
court determinations of stays pending appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
There is much work to be done to better understand and evaluate the 
workings of stays, including in areas beyond civil injunctive matters, like stays 
of agency decisions and rules and stays regarding habeas corpus and criminal 
matters. This Article describes the immense import of stay pending appeal 
determinations and argues that the primary purpose of granting a stay pending 
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appellate review is to ensure a meaningful opportunity to appeal. To navigate the 
tension between defendants’ meaningful opportunity to appeal and plaintiffs’ 
ability to enforce final judgments or orders, this Article suggests that the standard 
for stay determinations should differ and turn on the extent of the availability of 
review for the underlying order or judgment. 
The reforms to stays standards and procedures proposed here are not about 
process solely for the sake of process. Instead, when aggregated, the problems 
obscured in these procedural decisions have significant impacts on litigants and 
on our legal system. If we do not seriously engage and address the problems 
lurking in unstandardized procedural decisions, particularly when those 
decisions have political valences, there will be serious consequences for parties 
and the public. The importance of these ideas extends well beyond stays pending 
appeal and any other seeming procedural technicality. Courts and judges have a 
great deal of freedom with which to govern themselves and to figure out their 
own procedures. We must turn our eyes away from the substantive, material 
outcomes of cases and appeals and instead look at the procedure of procedure to 
see where, when viewed as a whole, the power of individual judges in different 
sets of lawless procedural decisions allows the federal appellate system’s tail to 
wag the dog with immense consequence. 
